Recent estimates suggest that out-of-pocket payments rose from around 33% in 2018 to over 85% in 2022, reflecting the collapse of financial protection mechanisms, declining insurance coverage, and the progressive dollarization of healthcare services. In some cases, patients were required to cover up to 90% of healthcare costs or seek private insurance as the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) started covering only 10% of health services (UNICEF, 2025).

This blog argues that the current conflict has not only disrupted healthcare delivery in Lebanon but has accelerated a deeper structural deterioration—transforming a weakened system into one that is increasingly unable to guarantee fair access to basic care.

A System Weakened Before the War
Lebanon’s healthcare crisis did not begin with the latest escalation; it is the result of years of systemic deterioration.

Following the 2019 economic collapse, the cost of healthcare surged as the Lebanese pound lost most of its value (Bou Sanayeh & El Chamieh, 2023). Out-of-pocket payments became the primary means of accessing care, pushing many households into financial hardship (UNICEF, 2025). Large segments of the population face significant barriers to affordable healthcare, reflecting deep structural inequities within the system, where uninsured and low-income patients are often forced to delay or forgo essential care due to unaffordable costs (LCPS, 2023).

At the same time, shortages of medicines and medical supplies became increasingly common, driven by import constraints and weak regulatory capacity (LCPS, 2025). The health system, heavily reliant on the private sector, struggled to maintain continuity of care (LCPS, 2023). These pre-existing vulnerabilities meant that Lebanon entered the current conflict with a system already under severe strain.
 
Conflict as a Force Multiplier of Health System Stress
These pre-existing vulnerabilities left the system highly exposed when conflict escalated, with the renewed violence acting as a force multiplier that has intensified existing structural weaknesses.

Airstrikes and insecurity have disrupted access to healthcare facilities, particularly in southern regions (Reuters, 2026). Several primary healthcare centers have been forced to close, while hospitals face surges in trauma cases alongside ongoing shortages of essential supplies. The World Health Organization has warned that continued violence risks overwhelming Lebanon’s already fragile health infrastructure (WHO, 2025).
Supply chains have also been severely affected. Fuel shortages, damaged roads, and insecurity have disrupted the delivery of medicines and equipment. In some cases, hospitals have reported the risk of running out of critical supplies within days (Reuters, 2026). These disruptions not only affect emergency care but also undermine the management of chronic diseases, vaccinations, and routine services.

In this context, healthcare delivery becomes reactive rather than preventive—focused on immediate survival rather than long-term health outcomes.
 
Healthcare Workers Under Pressure
Lebanon’s health workforce, once considered one of the country’s strengths, is increasingly under threat.

Even before the conflict, thousands of healthcare professionals had emigrated in search of better economic opportunities (LCPS, 2023). The current escalation has intensified this trend. Healthcare workers now face physical danger, psychological stress, and overwhelming workloads. Reports of attacks on healthcare facilities and personnel further exacerbate the situation, raising serious concerns about the protection of medical neutrality in conflict settings (The Guardian, 2026).

The loss of skilled professionals has long-term implications. A shrinking workforce reduces system capacity, increases burnout among remaining staff, and compromises the quality of care. Without targeted interventions, rebuilding this workforce will be a major challenge even after the conflict subsides.
 
Inequities in Access to Care
The impact of the crisis is not evenly distributed.

Vulnerable populations—including low-income households, rural and displaced communities, and refugees—face disproportionate barriers to accessing care (LCPS, 2023). As healthcare becomes increasingly privatized and dollarized, those without access to foreign currency are effectively excluded from services.

This growing inequality reflects a broader shift in Lebanon’s health system: from one that aimed to provide relatively broad access to one where care is increasingly determined by ability to pay (Civil Society Knowledge Center, 2023). The conflict has accelerated this shift, deepening existing social and health disparities.
 
Conclusion
Lebanon’s healthcare crisis is no longer a temporary emergency—it is becoming a structural reality.

The current conflict has exposed and intensified long-standing weaknesses, pushing the health system closer to its limits. While the system continues to demonstrate a degree of operational resilience—largely driven by healthcare workers and civil society, this resilience often reflects coping mechanisms rather than sustainable capacity (NNA, 2026). What is at stake is not only the ability to respond to war-related injuries but also the capacity to provide essential, everyday care to the population.

If the trajectory continues, the consequences might extend far beyond the immediate conflict, shaping health outcomes for years to come.

Addressing this crisis will require not only humanitarian responses, but also sustained efforts to restore financial protection mechanisms, support and retain the health workforce, and strengthen primary healthcare delivery. Without such measures, recovery will remain uncertain. The question, then, is not only how Lebanon’s health system will withstand the war, but whether it will be able to rebuild into a more resilient and equitable system once the fighting stops.
 
About the Author
Assadour Basmajian holds a Master of Public Health (MPH) in Health Policy and Management from EHESP (France) and was an intern in the Sustainability and Inclusive Development Cluster at IFI.

While this project would certainly improve regional connectivity, IMEC included only select countries and was perceived as the “economic wing” of the Abraham Accords, which led to diplomatic normalization between Israel and several Gulf countries. More recently however, the war in Gaza, the regional military escalation in Lebanon, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and the destabilization in the Gulf further complicated the feasibility of the project.

Unsurprisingly, Lebanon was not included in the project. The country continues to grapple with deep financial and political crises, while its transport infrastructure remains underdeveloped. As a result, it found itself with no seats at this table. However, in a notable development on February 25, President Joseph Aoun expressed Lebanon’s interest in joining the U.S. - led project following a meeting with France’s special envoy for IMEC. The article will examine the reasons behind Lebanon’s exclusion, assess the political consequences, and explore what a realistic pathway for reintegration into the regional economy might entail.

Lebanon's Exclusion: Causes and Consequences

 Beirut’s exclusion from IMEC and other regional projects stems from a set of uncertainties that made the country a non-desirable partner to work with. Economically, the crisis that has persisted since 2019 meant that the banking sector is effectively unable to perform its core functions at the same capacity as before. This is because banks do not have the same level of capital as pre-2019 to offer loans, nor can they offer them at the same pre-2019 interest rates which were much lower than today’s.

At the same time, Lebanon’s economy is has become primarily a cash economy, meaning there is little modern digital financial infrastructure, and transactions are much harder to monitor. When Lebanon was placed on the Financial Action Task Force’s grey list in 2024, it led to even less investor confidence and more scrutiny of transactions across borders. This placement signaled lots of shortcomings in financial transparency and in preventing corruption. For international investors and regional initiatives that require strict compliance with anti-money-laundering and financing standards, this creates additional due diligence costs and uncertainty around how funds are used and monitored.

For investors, this economic situation thus translates into higher risk, limited legal and financial safeguards, and uncertainty over returns, all of which make Lebanon a less attractive partner compared to other countries in the region.

Politically, it would be a major challenge to bring Lebanon and Israel under one regional project, especially considering the similar roles that they would be required to play geographically on the Eastern Mediterranean. Meanwhile, the expansion of the Israeli occupation in the south and the uncertainties springing from the ongoing war have raised serious doubts about the long-term security of the country which includes stable political solutions between the two countries that are not just limited to fragile ceasefires.

Moreover, Lebanon’s involvement would either require establishing direct rail links to Israel or the inclusion of Syria as a member of IMEC. Unfortunately for Lebanon, both options seem quite unrealistic at the present time considering the political and economic instability of Syria and as well as the ongoing Israeli military activities in Southern Lebanon. Consequently, Lebanon is seen as a less desirable partner for regional projects due to its border difficulties, security uncertainty, involvement in regional conflict, and Gulf disapproval of Hezbollah’s actions.

Lebanon is thus actively missing out on taking advantage of its strategic location on the Eastern Mediterranean as a potential link between east and west. Some estimates suggest that Lebanese participation in IMEC could generate between USD 4-5 billion in annual revenue and create thousands of jobs over an eight to 10-year period.
 
 Lebanon's Path Back into Regional Trade

Given the ongoing war and uncertainties, Lebanon needs to revise its diplomatic priorities and urgently rebuild its relationship with the Gulf. Historically, the major obstacles that blocked Gulf investment affected its relations with Lebanon were Lebanon’s security concerns (both internal and external threats) and Hezbollah’s growing influence. On March 2, 2026, the Lebanese government formally designated Hezbollah’s military activities in Lebanon illegal, a move that was immediately welcomed by the UAE’s Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan.

While Lebanon has recently seen growing Gulf investment in its digital sector, the Lebanese government should work to continue expanding the fields in which cooperation with the GCC can take place. Rebuilding such a relationship is a crucial first step because gulf investment can help in reviving various Lebanese sectors, which are in desperate need of activation following three years of war and seven years of financial collapse. This relationship can re-attract Gulf tourists back to Lebanon (which accounts for 50% of total tourism revenue) and greater direct investment in Lebanon’s development. This revival can be achieved in three ways. Increased government authority over the Beirut port, stronger security at the eastern borders (to avoid smuggling), and continued political efforts to re-establish positive relations with the gulf which require far less Iranian influence in the country’s affairs.

The second step concerns infrastructural development and building credibility. For Lebanon, this means that the more realistic objective for now is not to imagine immediate integration into IMEC’s original backbone, but to position itself as a credible supplementary branch. To achieve this, it needs to prioritize preparing the Beirut and Tripoli ports to handle heavier transit traffic through the following steps: reducing customs delays, digitizing customs and cargo clearance procedures to reduce delays and paperwork and upgrading storage and handling capacity. Lebanon also needs to ensure that the ports are connected to reliable roads and transport routes for smoother transport. It would also require a basic level of security and day-to-day operational reliability so that shipping firms and investors can treat Lebanese ports as working commercial hubs with true potential. In other words, Lebanon’s geography still offers an opportunity, but that opportunity will only matter if the state can show that its ports can move goods efficiently and with minimal disruption.

Finally, it is crucial for Lebanon to find a long-term security solution with Israel. The continuous threats of attacks on Lebanese soil and active Israeli military presence mean Lebanon cannot yet integrate in regional projects or attract any investment until security guarantees are restored. With Lebanon and Israel participating in direct talks for the first time since 1993 in Washington, a 10-day ceasefire was agreed upon, with intention to continue direct negotiations in the future and hopes of reaching long term peace. This helps Lebanon’s odds in joining IMEC by addressing both the security concerns and the limitations of Lebanon’s geography in relation to the rest of IMEC’s infrastructure.
 
Conclusion
 
Lebanon’s path toward becoming part of future regional trade and connectivity projects, therefore, depends less on declarations of interest and more on building the conditions that make its inclusion realistic. Rather than presenting itself as a replacement for existing corridor routes, Lebanon can position itself as a useful and reliable complement that supports broader regional trade as a meaningful post-war recovery strategy. In a post-war setting, this requires a steadier relationship with the Gulf that can reopen the door to tourism, investment, and increased confidence in the long-term stability of the country. Additionally, Lebanon needs firmer state control over the Beirut port and border crossings to limit smuggling and reassure external partners, as well as visible improvements in transport and trade infrastructure. Combined with long-term security guarantees, Lebanon can begin to move from being sidelined in regional economic planning back to being considered a reliable partner.

About the Author
Dany Salman was an intern at the Regional and International Affairs Cluster at IFI.

Mouhamad Kobeissi

Today, Lebanon’s main obstacle to recovery is not competitiveness or infrastructure, but the collapse of aggregate demand. While the country is trying to restore the credibility of its governance by reforming the banking system, protecting depositors, and reintegrating into the international financial system, these measures alone cannot halt the economy’s short-term decline. Reform initiatives will find it difficult to translate into real economic stabilization unless purchasing power and employment are restored, and available productive capacity is properly used.
​

A Collapse of Demand at the Core of the Crisis

Lebanon's aggregate spending, when measured in US Dollars, decreased by approximately 90% between 2018 and 2022 due to the inaccessibility of banking deposits, extreme loss of wages, and public spending cuts (Diwan, 2023). Government spending was reduced by nearly 90%, private investments fell by nearly 85%, and consumption of households by nearly 50%. This contraction made previously profitable companies unproductive and led households to maintain low levels of consumption. Despite the magnitude of the crisis, Lebanon has not experienced a complete collapse in productive capacity. While large-scale emigration, estimated at 220,279 Lebanese in 2025 (Enmaeya, 2026), has depleted human resources, substantial human capital and productive infrastructure remain. This indicates that the current economic collapse reflects underutilization rather than an irreversible destruction of latent economic potential.

The remittances from the diaspora have partially mitigated the collapse of domestic demand, but they are no longer enough. In 2023, remittance inflows reached their highest point post-2019, at USD 6.7 billion (approximately 30% of GDP), then dropped to USD 5.8 billion in 2024. This shows diaspora growing exhaustion and inability to support further (World Bank, 2025; World Bank, 2024).

Concurrently, other apparent financial buffers do little to support short-term demand. International price gains increased the value of gold reserves at Banque du Liban to USD 30.2 billion in 2025, strengthening the central bank’s balance sheet but providing no direct liquidity to households or depositors (BdL, 2025). Meanwhile, war related damage and losses in 2023–2024 (estimated at USD 8.5 billion) further reduced output, trade, tourism, and public services, contributing to an additional decline in real GDP in 2024 (World Bank, 2024).
 
Why Demand-Led Recovery Is the Immediate Priority

Lebanon presently displays underutilized productive capacity, especially in non-tradable areas like health, education, retail, and tourism, where the average utilization is approximated at 50% (Diwan, 2023). This causes the economy to be particularly sensitive to demand-side actions. Demand restoration can produce growth at a rapid rate, unlike export-led or investment-heavy strategies that involve huge capital formation.

A good example is the wages in the public sector. Wages are scheduled to increase by 2026 (Ministry of Finance, 2025) to 7.4 percent of GDP, which was 11.5 percent of GDP prior to the 2022-2023 crisis. Transparent, productivity-based wage increases theoretically increase consumption, reduce inequality, and stimulate labor markets.

Supplementary actions can be taken to ensure that businesses run near capacity, e.g., temporary credit facilities to companies, availability of cheap imports of energy and specially reduced taxation. This so-called catch-up growth might result in 15-20% growth in the GDP within two to three years, mostly by hiring workers but not by accumulating new capital (Diwan, 2023).

Policy Implications: Focus Before Reform Fatigue Sets In

The policy point is direct and simple: Lebanon ought to focus on the short-term demand stimulation as a sequencing policy, not as its alternative to structural reforms. The fiscal policy must be on labor-intensive sectors and social protection which must be funded by progressive tax collection on individuals with high net worth and selective tariffs on luxury imports. Simultaneously, the monetary policy must be well controlled to prevent new inflation. This may be by slow and moderate adjustment of the exchange rates, and they should stimulate local output. Besides this, governance reforms, banks restructuring and institutional transparency are also required. Nevertheless, their financial advantages do not readily come into action, and households and companies must survive in the short run to enjoy these advantages. Short-term stabilization of demand is an urgent requirement of the success of structural reforms because of this sequencing.
 
Conclusion
​
Economic rhetoric in Lebanon in 2026 will be overly complex and unfocused, aspiring to achieve too many things at once. This is what the statistics indicate: the economy will never recover with the demand being down. The best solution to stabilize in the short-term, build trust, and increase social resiliency is to reinstitute wages, jobs, and capacity utilization. In the absence of such an emphasis, even carefully thought reforms will be a ship without a sail and recovery will be slowed down instead of being realized.

About the Authors
Mouhamad Kobeissi was an intern in the Sustainability and Inclusive Development Cluster at IFI.

 
 

Today, AUBMUNC has achieved objectives once unthinkable, including securing scholarships and internship opportunities for awardees and attaining recognition from a UN body. Behind the scenes, AUBMUNC operates within a hierarchical system that assigns everyone a clearly defined role and level of authority, facilitating the smooth preparation of the conference. Within this structure, the rigorous process of topic selection, committee proposals, and approvals all take place.
 
1)    Procedures for Topic and Committee Selection:
Topic and committee selection at AUBMUNC are assigned to the Committees Team, which consists of coordinators, a consultant, and an Under-Secretary-General. Each person proposes ideas based on clear criteria that ensure both their relevance to current international politics and their feasibility within the conference’s resources. The chosen topics reflect the United Nations’ core values and strategic goals, anchored in international law and the Sustainable Development Goals, to advance global peace and security and to safeguard universal human rights. For instance, one of the expert committees at AUBMUNC’26 is the US House, which will address the public release of the Epstein files. This topic was chosen because it enables delegates to identify gaps in existing anti-corruption laws and to propose stronger legislation to prevent further abuse of power. This case aims not only to uphold accountability and justice but also to underscore the urgent need for robust confidentiality safeguards, appropriate use of sealed proceedings, and measures to restore public trust in officials.
 
Subsequently, topics are assigned to specific mandates or committees. These committees are selected based on their capacity to address the issues at hand, their level of authority, and their influence over the subject. For instance, UNICEF was chosen amongst multiple UN bodies for its dedication to upholding the rights of children, particularly those from marginalized communities, and its commitment to maintaining equality, development, health, and inclusivity.
 
 
2)    Voting Upon the Approval of Committee Proposals:
During this stage, the panel of committee coordinators evaluates all submitted topics and committee proposals. The evaluation involves a joint voting procedure to determine the top 30 approved committees, which are presented to delegates as the official AUBMUNC Committees list. It is essential to note that these committees are handpicked in accordance with clearly articulated criteria, including their capacity to produce fruitful policy-oriented debates and to tackle non-repetitive resolution clauses. For instance, one of the topics for AUBMUNC 2026, which falls under the mandate of the International Symposium of Global News Networks (ISGNN), aims to determine ethical boundaries for leaking classified government documents. Delegates, representing various news outlets, will discuss one of the most salient questions of modern-day journalism: when does the public’s right to know end and state confidentiality begin? Representatives must engage in debate to conclude the conference with a list of resolutions to address this multifaceted topic.
 
3)    Prioritizing Delegate Experience and Satisfaction:
As previously established, the final list of topics and committees is selected in compliance with criteria that emphasize current political relevance, consistency with international law, and the potential to generate productive debate. However, the real driver behind every stage of topic and committee selection – from proposals to the approvals and voting procedure – is delegate experience and satisfaction. The Committee’s team consistently strives to ensure that each delegate enjoys and benefits from the conference.
 
As delegates from a variety of schools and universities in Lebanon and abroad flock to AUBMUNC, the Committees team works meticulously to construct a final list of topics and committees that appeals to delegates of all proficiency levels and preferences. Committees are assigned beginner, intermediate, or expert labels to guide delegates in choosing based on their age and Model UN experience. Moreover, each set of committees includes a diverse spectrum of topics that caters to a wide range of interests.
 
This year, the beginner set deals with topics as elementary as human rights and climate change, and as niche as aviation and the entertainment industry. In line with this wide variety, the intermediate set addresses economic topics and historical events, such as the 1973 Chilean coup. Furthermore, the expert set explores topics including organ trafficking, proxy conflict escalation, and the future coordination of mass migration to planet X-47 following imminent planetary collapse. It even encompasses a special session in the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) that calls on members to discuss the proposed Super League.
 
The high degree of diversity is the highlight of AUBMUNC 2026. Considering committee registration is the starting point of AUBMUNC, it can either make or break the experience. By ensuring that delegates from diverse backgrounds can find at least one committee that appeals to them, the team ensures delegates enjoy the conference at every stage. The team’s success in prioritizing delegate experience and satisfaction is reflected in the increasing number of delegates AUBMUNC attracts each year.
 
 
Starting as a small university-led initiative ten years ago, AUBMUNC has grown to become a renowned MUN conference, recognized locally and internationally for its academic impact and prestigious reputation. It has achieved objectives once unthinkable, including securing scholarships and internship opportunities for awardees and earning recognition from a UN body. Year-long preparations take place to ensure the smooth flow of the conference and the quality of the delegate experience and satisfaction. This preparation includes the Committee’s team, which is tasked with creating topics and committees for the large number of delegates attending the conference. During each stage of the topic and committee selection, the team prioritizes political relevance and diversity and aims to cover all performance levels and interests. Through its delegate-centred approach, the team ensures that all conference attendees enjoy their experience and that MUN enthusiasts keep coming back every year.

About the Authors
Selina Riachi is a senior in Media and Communication, and Head of Communication & Committee Coordinator for AUBMUNC.
Yehya Iskandarani is a junior in Biology Premed, and a Committee Coordinator for AUBMUNC.

The negotiations aimed to discuss a plan put forward by the US, using US-sanctioned Qatari mediation. Qatari officials have repeatedly stated that Doha opened Hamas’s political office at Washington’s request, with Sheikh Meshal bin Hamad Al Thani noting that the U.S. sought the office to maintain indirect communication with Hamas. The US informed Qatar of the attack ten minutes after its occurrence. In an interview with CNN, the Qatari prime minister said “we are betrayed”.
 
This attack raises questions about U.S. security partnerships and the mandates of international mediators. This article examines why Doha and the GCC may need to diversify their security relationships and what alternatives they could pursue   
 
Impacts on the Mediation Mandate
                       
The Israeli attack on Doha casts doubts on Qatar’s ability to protect negotiating parties and itself, undermining its longstanding role as an international mediator and international conflict mediation efforts. Particularly, it impacts Qatar’s channels to armed groups, although Qatar’s longstanding relationship with such groups could withstand such a break in trust. Recognising Qatar’s crucial role in conflict mediation, US Secretary of State visited Doha to encourage the continuation of its services. For Qatar, mediation is constitutionally anchored and central to its national interests, helping maintain regional stability between Iran and the Levant. This makes it unlikely to halt its mediation efforts - demonstrated by Doha’s sustained role in Gaza ceasefire talks.
 
International Implications 
The attack prompts other mediators, and Arab mediators in particular, to question their security and role in regional peace efforts. For example, Oman may question its ability to host Yemen’s Ansarullah if U.S. protection does not extend to potential Israeli attacks. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, which have previously engaged in Palestinian negotiations, may also need to reconsider their security arrangements to continue such efforts. Uncertainty about security during negotiation, despite national interests could impede global peace processes.
 
While there is no international agreement protecting states engaging in mediation efforts from attack by negotiating parties, international norms such as Article 2.4 of the UN Charter and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations exist. Formalising the protection of mediators through international agreements might be necessary.
 
Several commentators predict a move away from discreet, independent mediation toward securitisation and alliance-backed forms as states demand stronger defensive or deterrent guarantees before hosting talks - raising the bar for neutral, informal mediation. Doha is also leading the conversation on the development of mediation strategy through initiatives like the Qatar Mediation Forum which this December focused on subjects like the Changing Landscape of Global Conflict and Mediation.[1] 
 
Casting Doubt on US Security Relations
 
It is important to keep in mind that earlier in June, Iran also struck the US Central Command base in Qatar’s Al Udaid, in retaliation for US strikes on nuclear facilities in Iran. Elizabeth Dent, Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said, “although Washington and Doha are still riding the high of President Trump’s May visit to Qatar and the estimated $1.2 trillion in bilateral agreements it yielded, the fact remains that the country has been targeted by two military attacks since then, due largely to U.S. actions”.
 
Doha’s defence partnership with the U.S. is rooted in the 1992 Defence Cooperation Agreement, which granted the U.S. access to Qatari bases, allowed pre-positioning of equipment, and enabled training for Qatar’s forces. Qatar later invested $8 billion in developing Al Udeid Air Base, supported U.S. naval resupply, and contributed to Combined Task Force 152. Its designation as a Major Non-NATO Ally further expanded access to U.S. military technology, joint research, and maintenance contracts. A week after the Doha attack, the U.S. signed a defence pact with Qatar, declaring that any attack on Qatar constitutes a threat to U.S. peace and security, and committing the U.S. to take all lawful measures, including military action if necessary, to restore stability.
 
Initially, the U.S. presence in the GCC protected the Gulf monarchs from Iran and Iraq. However, new threats are arising on the horizon. Oman’s foreign minister noted on November 11th at the IISS Manama Dialogue that Israel, not Iran, is the prime source of insecurity in the region. The Gulf countries are beginning to realise that they cannot put all their security eggs in one American basket. This sentiment was echoed by former Saudi ambassador to the US and UK at the Milken Institute’s Middle East and Africa Summit in early December.[2]  Commenting on this issue, Founder of Reconnaissance Research, Abdulaziz Al-Anjeri, told Bloomberg, “the US security umbrella is no longer full coverage - it leaves out protection from Israel, and that cannot be undone”.
           
Broader GCC security recalibrations

Experts largely agree that Qatar, along with the rest of the GCC, should diversify strategic defence partnerships. In July of 2024 Qatar and Turkiye bolstered their military ties to reinforce their joint force. Saudi Arabia and Turkiye have collaborated in weapons manufacturing with China. Saudi is also trying to work with Japan and the EU to manufacture fighter jets and eight days after the attacks on Doha, Riyadh signed a defence pact with Pakistan, similar to the pact signed by the US and Qatar.
 
The GCC should look inward to strengthen internal military cooperation. The emergency meeting of the Arab League and Organisation for Islamic Cooperation shortly after the Doha attacks is a great step, though largely symbolic. Alongside this meeting, however, the GCC Joint Defence Council met and condemned the attack on Qatar as a violation of all Gulf states’ security and international law, reaffirming that an assault on one member is an assault on all in accordance with the provisions of the Joint Defence Agreement. It announced steps to deepen defence integration, including enhanced intelligence sharing, upgraded joint defence plans, accelerated missile-warning cooperation, and coordinated air-defence exercises. A cohesive Gulf front could be a great attraction for security partnerships with Europe, and Asian countries that recognise Doha’s importance as a hub for conflict mediation and would have a vested interest in keeping Qatar safe. Although, the UAE and Bahrain's signatory to the Abraham Accords would likely cause complications.
 
The attack on Qatar underscored the longstanding security vulnerability in the Gulf: overreliance on a single external security guarantor. While the U.S. remains central to regional defense, the recent attacks on Doha highlighted the gaps in early-warning coordination and defense mechanisms that no single partner can fully remedy alone. Hence, diversifying security relations would allow GCC states to reduce strategic risk by having access to advanced technologies and strengthening political leverage in an increasingly multipolar environment. This does not mean that GCC states will aim to replace the U.S. alliance structure, but complementing it through new security partnerships with European and Asian defense actors, as well as investing in intra-Gulf security cooperation.

About the Author
Gulnar Kajan was an intern in IFI's Regional & International Affairs Cluster.

This piece examines the implications of neglecting trauma and gender disparities in derailing peace-making through the cases of Rwanda and South Sudan. In essence, there can never be permanent peace until the mediation process is trauma-conscious and gender-sensitive.

Trauma as an Unseen Negotiator

​Conflict leaves psychological scars that are profound not only on an individual level but also on society. WHO estimates that approximately 1 out of 5 individuals in conflict-affected regions address the mental health problem (depression, anxiety, or PTSD). This trauma shapes the trust, memory, and communication process, which are the key aspects of negotiation. It is frequently difficult for survivors to sit at the same table with the perpetrators, or the people who have caused the pain, and communities fractured by violence may reject settlements that feel detached from lived suffering.
 
Nevertheless, many of the mediation processes tend to neglect the role and impact of trauma. Instead, the focus is usually on ceasefires, power sharing, and elections, while psychosocial wounds are often ignored. The result is peace deals that appear to be sound on paper, but when social cohesion is too weak, the deals often break down.
 
Insights from the Issam Fares Institute’s discussion on “Geopsychiatry in Policy Making: Implications for War and Peace” similarly underscore that trauma and mental health are deeply political, shaped by geography, displacement, and structural inequality, and must be treated as core dimensions of conflict resolution and peacebuilding rather than secondary humanitarian concerns.​

Rwanda: Trauma and the Gacaca Model

Few contexts illustrate the scale of collective trauma, such as the situation in post-genocide Rwanda. In just 100 days in 1994, around 800,000 people were killed, leaving a nation shattered. Traditional courts were unable to process the sheer volume of crimes. Rwanda’s answer was the “Gacaca” community-based courts, which tried nearly 1.9 million cases between 2002 and 2012, according to the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions.

Gacaca was concerned with justice and reconciliation, bringing survivors and perpetrators face-to-face to address the atrocities of the genocide. Survivors emerged and gave their testimonies publicly, while perpetrators confessed, allowing entire communities to sit down and discuss the profound issues of violence and forgiveness. While this system accelerated accountability, its approach to trauma was complex and often contradictory.

Studies revealed that the process had a dual impact: some of the survivors were re-traumatized due to the repeated retelling of their traumatic events in the lack of proper psychological, as well as psychosocial support. On the other hand, in other survivors, the social disclosure of the perpetrators and the process of telling their stories in front of their community produced deeply therapeutic results. This fact shows that, even though the Gacaca system was characterized by a significant lack of consideration of the psychosocial needs, in fact, it indicated the enormous potential of the community-based truth-telling to serve as a viable mechanism of healing and reconciliation.

More importantly, women were also placed on the center stage of post-conflict reconstruction in Rwanda. Women currently occupy 61 percent of the seats in parliament, the highest percentage in the world. Their role in formulating gender-sensitive legislation, from inheritance rights to protection against gender-based violence, demonstrates how involving women can bring about change in the healing of a society. Rwanda is an exemplary case study that highlights the importance of recognizing and integrating the roles of trauma and gender in the pursuit of long-term peace.

South Sudan: The Cost of Exclusion

If Rwanda highlights progress, South Sudan reveals the costs of neglect. Since its independence in 2011, South Sudan has faced cycles of civil war that have displaced millions. The 2018 peace agreement was hailed as a breakthrough; however, women were largely sidelined, as only 15% of signatories in recent African peace processes have been women.

This omission is far-reaching. Conflict-related sexual violence has affected South Sudanese women most; according to UN Women, rape is a common form of weapon of war. However, their voices in determining accountability and recovery processes remain muted. Community discussions usually proceed without the incorporation of trauma healing and leave the survivors virtually out of the national reconciliation process.

As of 2022, South Sudan was ranked as one of the three highest nations in the world in conflict-related sexual violence. The absence of trauma-informed and gender-sensitive mediation has led to weak agreements that are likely to backfire, which explains the risk of recreating a hermetic, elite-led peace formula.

The Gender Gap in Mediation

Globally, women continue to be systematically underrepresented in formal peace processes: in 2023, women made up only 9.6% of negotiators, 13.7% of mediators, and 26.6% of signatories in peace and ceasefire agreements worldwide. This exclusion is not only unjust but also counterproductive.

Research reveals that the active role of women is linked with the durability of peace agreements. The fact that women are included in the process of negotiations increases the chances of successful peace agreements that last at least 35% within a span of at least 15 years. Moreover, the involvement of women will tend to expand the system to include the elements of justice, education, and healthcare, which will support the pillars that will help promote long-term stability directly.

The Role of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325

Driven by the UN Security Council Resolution 1325, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has transformed the discourse regarding conflict and peace in a fundamental way. This international framework became the first to take the discussion beyond the idea of women being victims of war and the critical and active part they have in creating peace. This agenda has resulted in major policy shifts within the last 25 years, which have seen gender considerations being institutionalized in peacekeeping missions and national action plans across the globe.

Undeniably, these are notable achievements, but the path to full implementation is far from complete. The agenda was a necessary initial step, rather than a goal. There is still uneven progress, and the policy-practice gap is still there. Although there is an apparent requirement for meaningful inclusion of women, they are often tokenistic in formal peace processes; they are granted a seat at the table but are often marginalized in actual decision-making. We must move beyond symbolic actions to actual empowerment so that the voices of women and their personal experiences of conflict become central to the development of a more sustainable and peaceful world.

Centering Survivors’ Healing: Trauma-Informed Mediation for Durable Peace

When mediation overlooks the impact of trauma on communities, any peace that emerges rests on an unstable foundation. A trauma‑informed mediation framework recognises survivors’ emotional injuries, designs procedures that minimise the risk of re‑traumatisation, and embeds mental health and psychosocial support into peacebuilding.

This can include community healing rituals, counselling and peer‑support groups, storytelling circles, and carefully sequenced political dialogue, all of which post‑genocide and post‑conflict studies show can help rebuild trust and foster reconciliation.

Moreover, trauma-informed approaches are cost-effective in the long run. WHO estimates that every $1 invested in mental health yields a $4 return in improved health and productivity (WHO, 2020). In post-conflict settings, these dividends are not only economic but also political, reinforcing peace dividends that prevent relapse into violence.

Toward Gender-Sensitive, Trauma-Informed Mediation

The cases of Rwanda and South Sudan illustrate a clear lesson: peace processes that ignore the roles of trauma and gender are deficient and unsustainable. Moving forward, mediators, policymakers, and international organizations must:

1. Institutionalize trauma support in mediation. Embed psychosocial services into peace processes, ensuring survivors can participate without re-traumatization. This means training mediators in trauma awareness and providing safe spaces for testimony.
   
   
2. Guarantee women’s substantive participation. Move beyond symbolic seats at the table by adopting binding quotas for women in delegations and integrating women’s organizations into track II and grassroots negotiations.
   
   
3. Adopt intersectional approaches. Recognize that trauma and gender intersect with other identities such as ethnicity, class, and age. Policies must address these layered vulnerabilities to avoid reproducing inequalities.
   
   
4. Leverage local practices. Traditional mechanisms, such as Rwanda’s Gacaca courts or South Sudanese community dialogues, should be adapted to incorporate trauma healing and gender equity, thereby blending cultural legitimacy with human rights standards.
   
   
5. Monitor and evaluate inclusivity. International donors and peace-supporting institutions should tie funding to concrete benchmarks on trauma-informed and gender-sensitive practices.
   
   

Conclusion: Building Peace That Lasts

The collapse of nearly 40% of peace agreements within five years is not inevitable; it is one of the symptoms of mediation that has overlooked the human dimensions of conflict. Rwanda’s progress and South Sudan’s struggles show that trauma and gender are not side issues, but central pillars of sustainable peace.

We must reconsider mediation as the number of global conflicts increases. Peace is more than just a signature sheet; it is about healing wounds, regaining trust, and ensuring every voice is heard, especially those of women. Unless we make this transition, peace will remain fragile. Through it, mediation might transform a provisional ceasefire into a long-term foundation for justice and reconciliation.

About the Author
Sam Chaaban was an intern in IFI's Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Regional Hub.

يُنظّم النّاشطون والإعلاميّون مسيراتٍ وحملاتٍ لدعمِ غزّة ومساندتها، يقفزون من بيروت نحو فلسطين متفادين أن يصيبهم تمادي الإحتلال في الجنوب، يغضّون أبصارهم عن استهدافاتٍ يوميّةٍ أودت بحياة نحو 320 شخصاً وجرحت ما يقارب الألف مدنيٍّ لبنانيٍّ منذ وقف إطلاق
النّار. فهل أضاع اللّبناني انتماءه، أم ضاع هو بين دهاليز السّياسة؟

وقد كان للإعلامِ دورٌ كبيرٌ في هذا الإنفصال بين حدود الوطن وعاصمته، فيتعامل معهُ كخبرٍ طارئ لا كقضيّةٍ وطنيّة، ويتخبّط الجنوبُ وسط تغطيةٍ لا تلمسُ حزنه، فقط يلتقط صوراً للدّمار ليرميه في وجه الجنوبيّين، ملقياً اللّوم عليهم، باعتبارهم جلاّداً لا ضحيّةً، ويكون بذلك قد وضع حجراً آخراً فوق الجدار الذي يحدُّ بين الهامش المتألّم والمدينة المركزية، فيشعر المواطن أنّه معزولٌ عن بلده.

يعيشُ أهل الجنوب معركةً يوميّةً مع الخوفِ والنّزوحِ والإنذارات التي تجبر المدنيّين على إخلاء بيوتهم قسراً، ورؤيتها تتهدّمُ حجراً على حجر، مهشّمةً أحلامهم ودفاتر صغارهم، التي ملؤوها برسوماتٍ ملوّنةٍ لا تعكس ما يعيشونه! فقد سجّل لبنان أكثر من 31 ألف خرق لاتّفاق وقف إطلاق النّار وفق تقارير الجيش الّلبناني، وأُجبر ما يزيد عن 90 ألف مدني على النّزوح من قراهم ومنازلهم بدون أن يعلموا ما إن كانوا سيعودون، وإن عادوا، هل ستكون الدّيار كما غادروها؟ تبقى كل الأسئلةِ بلا إجابات، فقد طالَ الدّمار أكثر من 162 ألف وحدة سكنيّة حيثُ قُدّرت كلفة الأضرار بنحو 4,6 مليار دولار أميركي، أي ما يعادل 67%؜ من إجمالي حجم الأضرار النّاتجة عن الحرب وفقاً للتقييم السّريع للأضرار والاحتياجات الناجم عن البنك الدّولي (2025). كما قدّر أنّ نحو 162,900 وحدة سكنيّة قد تأثّرت بالنّزاع، ما يمثّل 10%؜ من عدد المباني السّكنية في لبنان قبل اندلاع الحرب. فهل من سياسات إسكان عادلة تحمي الفقراء والمهجّرين وسط أزمة السّكن وغلاء الإيجارات والمعيشة في المستقبل القريب؟ هذا ومن دون أن ننسى الدمار في البنى التحتيّة والمدارس والمستشفيات وشبكات المياه والكهرباء في غالبية قرى الحافّة الأماميّة، واستباحة آلة القتل الإسرائيلية لعدّة بلدات برّاً (ميس الجبل، بيت ليف، كفركلا، عيترون، وغيرها) ممّا يجعل العودة إليها غير ممكنة ومحفوفة بالمخاطر حتى للأشخاص الذين يمتلكون القدرة الماليّة الكافية.

صوتُ الجنوب خافت، لا يصل إلى بيروت مهما تألّم، يعضُّ على جراحه ويقاوم عدوّاً لا يلتزم حتى بقوانين الحرب، ولما لا؟ فلا رادع له. وقد اختارت الدّولة اللبنانيّة أن تصمّ آذانها، فغابت التّصريحات الرّسمية التضامنية إلّا ما قيلَ رفعاً للعتبِ، كأنّهُ قد حُكِم على هذه الأرض بالشّقاء، من دونِ أن ننسى غياب خطط الطوارئ، وتعويض المتضرّرين، والدّعم النفسي.

ويُعدّ ملفّ الأسرى هو أكثر ما تخاذلت بهِ الدّولةُ الّلبنانيّة، إذ أكّدت مصادر معنية لصحيفة «الأخبار»، أنّ الحكومة لا تتابع الملف بشكلٍ جدّي، باستثناء المناشدات العلنية. ويُعتبر بيان المدير العام للأمن العام اللواء حسن شقير، الخطوة الرسمية الوحيدة، فقد رفع جهازه لائحة بـ16 أسيراً و65 مفقوداً. ومن ضمن الأسرى صيّادي سمك ورعاة وجرحى أطلقت عليهم إسرائيل النّار عند دخولهم لقراهم عند الحدود بعد وقف إطلاق النّار، ممّا يُثبت مجدّداً وحشيّة آلة القتل التي لا تتوقّف.

ولم تكن الطّبيعة بمنأى عن الحربِ، فقد ارتكبت إسرائيل إبادة بيئيّة أيضاً فالأضرار التي خلّفها القصف المتواصل للأحراج والجبال والغابات لا تقلّ فداحةً عن الجوانب الأخرى. فلا زالت إسرائيل تستخدم الفوسفور الأبيض الذي قدّرت المساحات التي طاولها بنحو ١٠ كلم مربّع، بالإضافة إلى الأسلحة الحارقة التّدميريّة والقنابل المحرّمة دولياً. كما قضت على أنواع كثيرة من الزواحف والحشرات والطيور المقيمة والحيوانات البريّة، إذ أصدرت وزيرة البيئة الّلبنانية تقريراً يفيدُ أنّ الأضرار تصل كلفتها إلى 6.8 مليون دولار.

إنّ الجنوبَ ليس بُقعةً مجهولة الهويّة، ولا ساحة حرب، فقد غنّى لهُ أعظم الفنّانون كمارسيل خليفة وزياد الرّحباني، وكتب له نزار قبّاني، وهتف لهُ الآلاف من قلبِ مدينة صور "يا حبيبي يا جنوب" مع جوليا بطرس.. الجنوبُ أرضٌ صامدةٌ وقفت في وجهِ محتلٍّ غاصبٍ منذُ عقود، الجنوبُ عزٌّ وشجر زيتونٍ عريق، الجنوبُ نساءٌ لا يدعنَكَ تغادر من دون أن تشرب الشّاي، ورجالٌ ذوو نخوةٍ وبسالة.

سلاح أهلُ الجنوب حُبُّ الحياةِ والأرض، وتستحقُّ هذه الأرض أن نخاف عليها، لا أن نخاف منها، فلا زالت وحدها تمشي فوق الجمر.

عن الكاتبة
.ضحى عيسى كانت متدرّبة في وحدة الإعلام والتواصل في المعهد 

Sara Azzi​

Lebanon is one of the most politically saturated countries in the region, where public life is shaped by sectarian arrangements, geopolitical pressures, and the consequences of state collapse. Yet surveys show that a striking majority of young Lebanese have turned away from formal politics. A recent study finds that nearly 70% of Lebanese youth express little to no interest in politics, while 90% report dissatisfaction with Lebanon’s governance system. [1] For a generation that mobilized in the hundreds of thousands during the 2019 Thawra, this detachment demands explanation

The prevailing narrative casts young people as apathetic or distracted, but this interpretation understates the reality. Lebanese youth are not disengaged because of ignorance or indifference. Most are highly aware of political developments and acutely affected by their consequences. What is often described as “apathy” is better understood as a rational response to a system that offers no meaningful pathways for youth inclusion. This distinction matters: youth disengagement is not a behavioral failure but an institutional one. 

From mobilization to withdrawal

The trajectory from 2019 to today illustrates how initial political enthusiasm gradually hardened into disillusionment. The 2019 Thawra represented a historic moment in which young people articulated demands for accountability, social justice, and non-sectarian reform. That mobilization helped usher in limited but symbolically important gains during the 2022 parliamentary elections, when 13 reformist MPs entered parliament, many of which were backed by youth-driven campaigning.

Yet momentum dissipated. The 2025 municipal elections, the first since Lebanon’s systemic collapse, saw little evidence of substantial youth participation, whether in candidacy or turnout. Established parties regained control of most arenas, and no meaningful youth breakthrough occurred. The arc is consistent; we see initial mobilization, modest openings, institutional resistance, and eventual withdrawal. For many young Lebanese, the lesson seems clear: despite their efforts, the political system remains impermeable.

Why youth withdraw

Lebanese youth are disengaged because political participation offers few credible returns. Three structural barriers are particularly significant.

Firstly, young people face restrictive institutional barriers. Lebanon maintains one of the region’s highest voting ages, at 21. Formal politics remains dominated by entrenched sectarian elites, and running for office requires resources, networks, and patronage relationships that most youth do not possess. Party structures are hierarchical and typically gerontocratic, limiting youth influence even within internal decision-making. Symbolic gestures such as placing a young candidate at the bottom of an electoral list rarely translates into real power.

Second, economic precarity significantly shapes youth political behavior. Youth unemployment in Lebanon has remained high for years, and the economic crisis has deepened vulnerabilities. According to a Migration Insights report, more than 1/3 of the population, and a majority of youth, express a desire to emigrate. Another source notes that 58% of Lebanese under 30 are considering leaving the country. Political engagement requires time, resources, and stability; for many young people navigating inflation, intermittent income, war, and daily uncertainty, survival becomes the primary concern.

Third, youth is almost statistically invisible in Lebanon’s political landscape. Unlike Iraq, Tunisia, or Palestine, Lebanon does not publish youth-disaggregated electoral data. NGOs and monitors track gender but not age. Research on youth politics is sparse, and even international organisations operating in Lebanon tend to consult established experts rather than youth themselves. This absence is not merely a data problem, it is a political one. If youth are not measured or consulted, they cannot be meaningfully integrated into policymaking. Scholars such as Mona Harb have written about this fragmentation and the state’s failure to imagine youth as political agents. Earlier studies similarly highlight a persistent disconnect between youth civic activity and formal political structures.

Taken together, these dynamics create a political environment in which disengagement appears logical. When institutions do not open their doors, young people stop knocking.

Regional contrast and Recommendations

While Lebanon struggles to institutionalize youth inclusion, Iraq offers a contrasting approach. In 2025, Iraq launched its first Youth Advisory Council, selecting 13 young leaders to advise on national programs. Parallel initiatives by Iraq’s Supreme Council for Youth have created youth entrepreneurship hubs, alongside youth climate teams operating across several provinces. Though not flawless, these efforts illustrate how institutional design can influence engagement. When states and institutions create visible roles, youth respond.

Lebanon’s youth disengagement carries significant long-term risks. If young people withdraw from formal politics while simultaneously emigrating at high rates, the country may not lose only its talent but also its future political class. The 2026 parliamentary elections may deepen a cycle in which disinterest leads to abstention, which strengthens established elites and consequently deepens political stagnation. Breaking this dynamic requires more than civic awareness campaigns. It demands institutional change.

To rebuild trust and create meaningful political entry points, Lebanon could: introduce youth quotas within municipal councils or parliamentary committees; institutionalize youth advisory bodies attached to ministries and parliament; and ensure policy consultations include young voices. Addressing data gaps, such as publishing youth-specific turnout figures and creating structured shadowing schemes in ministries could further cultivate a future political class.

These steps would not resolve Lebanon’s political crisis, but they would help prevent the loss of an entire political generation. Lebanon has no shortage of politically conscious youth. What lacks are the structures capable of bringing them into public life as partners in shaping the country’s future.


[1] Khayat & Halabi (2025), Youth and their engagement in Lebanon, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.



​About the Author
Sara Azzi was an intern in IFI's Regional & International Affairs Cluster.

This article aims to examine whether U.S. investments, and massive embassy projects truly support Lebanon’s stability, or instead advance a strategic agenda that mixes soft power with hard security. The article will dive into the many layers of U.S. involvement in Lebanon: from shaping the future through educational investment, to fortifying stability with security assistance; from leveraging the country’s strategic geography, to the subtle yet significant influence of individual actors like Tom Barrack; and finally, to the overarching strategies of containment that frame regional calculations. By following these threads, we uncover how a mix of ambition, strategy, and circumstance continues to define Lebanon’s place in a turbulent region and highlight a consistent effort to maintain a long-term U.S. presence to safeguard American regional interests under the broader goal of promoting stability.
 
 
U.S. Aid or Strategic Investment?
 
Starting with one of the most long-term and transformative forms of engagement, we turn to the role of education and economic aid.
 
In November 2022, USAID Administrator Samantha Power announced $50 million to support higher education in Lebanon, including full scholarships at AUB and LAU and partial aid for about 3,500 students during the economic crisis.
 
Power emphasized that this investment reflected the program as a way to “empower youth to shape Lebanon’s future,” showing how U.S. educational aid also works as a soft-power tool that promotes US governance-aligned skills and regional connections.
 
The U.S. aid was not just limited to education, but it also covered the sectors of agriculture and small businesses.  Within this context, on October 1, 2024, USAID launched ELSA, a five-year, $10 million agriculture program aimed at improving market access and strengthening rural livelihoods. By investing in these sectors, the U.S. seeks to promote economic stability, food security, and local self-reliance, reinforcing broader stability and economic resilience in Lebanon.
 
Security Assistance and Strategic Leverage
 
Beyond education and agriculture, U.S. support has also targeted Lebanon’s fragile security sector. In January 2023, Washington announced the rerouting of $72 million in assistance to help pay the salaries of Lebanese soldiers and police officers, marking the first time American funds were used directly for wages. The U.S. actively started supporting the Lebanese army and security institutions after the withdrawal of the Syrian army since 2005 with the aim to strengthen the capabilities of Lebanese soldiers and officers in order to contain the rising power of Hezbollah’s armed wing.
 
The 2024 war between Israel and Hezbollah further accelerated this process, where recently, the U.S. approved an additional $230 million for Lebanon’s armed and internal security forces, explicitly tied to efforts to disarm Hezbollah and uphold UN Resolution 1701, the framework governing the cessation of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel. This aid was a continuation of long-standing U.S. support to the Lebanese Armed Forces, which has included training, equipment, and weapons for years. By expanding support now, Washington is signaling its intent to strengthen the army as the institution it sees best positioned to manage, or eventually absorb, the security role currently filled by Hezbollah. This significant investment underscores that American aid is not only about preventing state collapse but also about shaping Lebanon’s security order in ways that align with its regional agenda.
 
Strategic Geography

Meanwhile, the expansion of the embassy in Awkar, reveals how deeply embedded American influence has become in Lebanon’s post-war landscape. Described by then Ambassador David Hale as a symbol of an “enduring partnership” between the two countries, the project is one of the largest U.S. embassies in the world, second only to Baghdad. While officially framed as a commitment to a “secure, stable, and sovereign Lebanon”, its size reflects recognition of Lebanon’s strategic location at the intersection of Syria, Israel, and the Eastern Mediterranean. From Awkar, the U.S. can monitor Hezbollah, track Iranian influence, and coordinate military and aid programs that shape Lebanon’s internal balance of power.

Similarly, the revival of the Kleiat (René Mouawad) Airport project in northern Lebanon reflects similar strategic logic. Just seven kilometers from Syria and near Tripoli, the site has long attracted U.S. and regional interest for its potential dual civilian–military use. All these steps signals that U.S. has long-term strategic interests in Lebanon.
 
 
Tom Barrack and the Politics of Containment
 
Of course, U.S. interests and commitments towards Lebanon comes at a certain cost. This intertwining of soft power and hard security reflects how U.S. investment in Lebanon operates on both economic and strategic levels. U.S. envoy Tom Barrack’s repeated visits to Beirut reveal Washington’s broader goal: to manage regional security while maintaining influence within Lebanon’s fragile political system. His statements on  disarmament and state reform show that U.S. aid and diplomacy are not separate from security interests, they are part of a single strategy that blends development with geopolitical control.
 
His active involvement fits into a broader U.S. strategy that became more assertive after the war, aiming to contain Hezbollah, limit Iranian influence, and prepare the ground for eventual security normalization between Beirut and Tel Aviv. By describing disarmament as a “Lebanese-led process”, the U.S. frames its involvement as supportive of national sovereignty while maintaining a guiding role in Lebanon’s path toward stability. This approach shows the U.S. attempting to support Lebanon’s sovereignty while also pursuing its regional security priorities, placing it in an active but measured role within both local and regional developments.
 
Hezbollah, meanwhile, accuses Barrack of attempting to provoke internal conflict by pushing the army toward confrontation, serving Israeli interests at Lebanon’s expense. Barrack, in turn, situates Lebanon’s crisis within a broader regional map involving Israel, Syria, and Iran, warning that Lebanon risks being “swallowed” by its neighbors without action.

In conclusion, the U.S.’s investments in Lebanon, from embassies and education to security support and strategic projects, reflect a deliberate strategy: Lebanon’s location, institutions, and regional significance make it a key partner in promoting stability in the Middle East. Washington continues to “bet” on Lebanon because supporting its political and security landscape helps foster regional stability and cooperation.

Critics see leverage, others see stabilization, yet Lebanon’s challenge remains turning foreign support into real state capacity. The question remains: how much of Lebanon will benefit from the U.S. role and at what cost?

​
​About the Author
Natalie Dergham was an intern in IFI's Regional & International Affairs Cluster.

Lama Chatila

In a world full of wars between distinct cultures and perspectives, different religions and sects, one third party plays an important role in writing the narrative of the war or conflict to the public and in being a link between the conflicting sides; this party is the translator. The role of a translator in a political conflict is not just converting a source text in one language to a target text in another. A translator has an impact on the public narrative of a war, facing political, cultural, emotional, and ethical challenges in reporting a conflict objectively, without bias or falsification.

Lexical Choice and Cultural Boundaries

One of the most significant challenges that a translator faces is the choice of words, in which the translator has to render the message selecting words that are convenient to the boundaries, such as language-specific idioms and collocations, customs and traditions, and religion and beliefs of the target audience. Regarding this ethical, political and cultural issue, a translator should have well-rounded knowledge, open-mindedness, and intellect; must be trustful, flexible, and well-informed of the vulnerabilities and cultural boundaries of every community he/she is addressing. Additionally, translators are ethically obligated to deliver unbiased translations that faithfully represent the source material without allowing their personal beliefs, preferences, or cultural perspectives to influence the outcome (Chesterman, 1997b). Another responsibility that a translator holds is related to emotions, in two aspects. First, a translator should accurately convey the emotions of interviewees in writing, without exaggerating or downplaying. Second, the translator must remain stable and control his/her emotions while translating any suffering, emotional moment, without being attracted to or influenced by any factor that may affect the rendition.    
 
Russia – Ukraine War

In the Russia – Ukraine War, translators have used “الحرب الروسية الأوكرانية”, which is somehow the most objective expression to write or translate. However, many journalists and translators, especially in the West, refer to it as the “Russian War on Ukraine - الحرب الروسية على أوكرانيا”. This shows how the West tried to influence its audience through “naming” the war, as the West generally supports Ukraine.
 
How to Name the War in Gaza?

Similarly, the media, whether in the West or in the Arab World, expressed their political ideology and beliefs through how they named the “Israel-Gaza War,” whereby most media in the Arab World use “الحرب الإسرائيلية على غزة”. However, in the West, many use “Israel-Gaza War” to show that there is a balance and conflict between the two parties, denying that there is a side attacking the other. As mentioned by AlJazeera online, “bias in favour of Israel” is “irreparably damaging” the credibility of news agencies considered “mainstream” in the eyes of Arabs and others.” Some outlets have used the title “Israel - Hamas War,” excluding “Gaza” in an attempt to justify Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip, trying to convince their audience that the target is “Hamas” and not the people of Gaza people. At the beginning of the war, some media platforms even used the headline “Israel at War.”  For example, the BBC was criticized for its policy not to describe Hamas as “terrorists.” In response, veteran BBC correspondent John Simpsons said, “We don’t take sides. We don’t use loaded words like ‘evil’ or ‘cowardly.’ We don’t talk about ‘terrorists.’ And we’re not the only ones to follow this line. Some of the world’s most respected news organizations have exactly the same policy.”
 
Resister or Terrorist?

Amid a sharp division in the Arab World and between the West and the Middle East, media used different terms while referring to the same concerned party. For instance, the word “militant” in English can be translated into “مسلح” or “عسكري” in Arabic. Some translators have used the word “مقاوم”,
“إرهابي”, or “مقاتل”. A “resister - مقاوم” for one society can be a “terrorist - إرهابي” for another. This variation in naming is due to political, or possibly religious, beliefs, playing an important role in affecting the public discourse on these issues.
 
Divergent Descriptions

Meanwhile, looking at the term “hostages,” some outlets have used “أسرى  prisoners”, “رهائن - hostages”, or simply, “محتجزين – detainees.” To illustrate, some translators will use the word “شهداء” in Arabic when translating the term “dead - وفيات”, in English, or “killed - قتلى”. The word “victims” may not be translated into “ضحايا”
 
A Tool of War

When a multinational force led by the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, U.S. forces hired thousands of Iraqi translators to work with them as interpreters; not all of them were professionals; some were local citizens and were also assigned to tell them what was going on. This caused a problem with the other local or foreign parties involved in the conflict against the Western forces. In addition, many translators had to flee to Europe, such as former interpreter Shaker Jeffrey, who fled to Germany while awaiting admission to the United States; many others were killed. Furthermore, some have been investigated. Even those working in international translation agencies faced pressures and were murdered. This highlights how translators can be perceived as “traitors” in their country or, at the very least, affiliated with a side that puts them at risk; and presents yet another challenge in translators’ line of work. Here, “language” is no longer a means of communication but has become a tool of war.
 
Conclusion

The role of a translator in a war goes far beyond the words they put together to be able to convey an idea in a different language. Instead, it is based on understanding and accepting the boundaries (language-specific expressions, beliefs, ideology, etc.) of a specific community, placing the translator in front of ethical, political, and emotional dilemmas. Being considered a hero or a betrayer, a translator is a third-party actor in any conflict, a major player working in the shadows, whose narrative has a profound influence on the war.
​
Translators have become actors in the geopolitical arena by employing language and may be considered the “third party.” The “accuracy” of the translation and the way of narrating the war or conflict, avoiding fabricated or inadequate translation, depends on how honest a translator is. In the way they render the speech or text, they play a crucial role in reflecting the events or ideas, and have a huge impact on public discourse.

​​About the Author
Lama Chatila is an intern in IFI's Communications Unit.