A Country in Crisis, a Fortress in the Hills: The U.S. Stakes in Lebanon

Natalie Dergham​

In a country marked by significant political instability, the United States is erecting one of its largest embassies, an almost billion-dollar fortress overlooking the hills of Awkar. The irony is striking: at a time when financial instituions have failed, the government is facing economic and political challenges, Washington’s financial commitment is expanding, not contracting. What is the rationale behind this? What does the U.S. genuinely desire in Lebanon? Why does it continue to pour resources into a country that seems to be perpetually on the edge of failure?

This article aims to examine whether U.S. investments, and massive embassy projects truly support Lebanon’s stability, or instead advance a strategic agenda that mixes soft power with hard security. The article will dive into the many layers of U.S. involvement in Lebanon: from shaping the future through educational investment, to fortifying stability with security assistance; from leveraging the country’s strategic geography, to the subtle yet significant influence of individual actors like Tom Barrack; and finally, to the overarching strategies of containment that frame regional calculations. By following these threads, we uncover how a mix of ambition, strategy, and circumstance continues to define Lebanon’s place in a turbulent region and highlight a consistent effort to maintain a long-term U.S. presence to safeguard American regional interests under the broader goal of promoting stability.
 
 
U.S. Aid or Strategic Investment?
 
Starting with one of the most long-term and transformative forms of engagement, we turn to the role of education and economic aid.
 
In November 2022, USAID Administrator Samantha Power announced $50 million to support higher education in Lebanon, including full scholarships at AUB and LAU and partial aid for about 3,500 students during the economic crisis.
 
Power emphasized that this investment reflected the program as a way to “empower youth to shape Lebanon’s future,” showing how U.S. educational aid also works as a soft-power tool that promotes US governance-aligned skills and regional connections.
 
The U.S. aid was not just limited to education, but it also covered the sectors of agriculture and small businesses.  Within this context, on October 1, 2024, USAID launched ELSA, a five-year, $10 million agriculture program aimed at improving market access and strengthening rural livelihoods. By investing in these sectors, the U.S. seeks to promote economic stability, food security, and local self-reliance, reinforcing broader stability and economic resilience in Lebanon.
 
Security Assistance and Strategic Leverage
 
Beyond education and agriculture, U.S. support has also targeted Lebanon’s fragile security sector. In January 2023, Washington announced the rerouting of $72 million in assistance to help pay the salaries of Lebanese soldiers and police officers, marking the first time American funds were used directly for wages. The U.S. actively started supporting the Lebanese army and security institutions after the withdrawal of the Syrian army since 2005 with the aim to strengthen the capabilities of Lebanese soldiers and officers in order to contain the rising power of Hezbollah’s armed wing.
 
The 2024 war between Israel and Hezbollah further accelerated this process, where recently, the U.S. approved an additional $230 million for Lebanon’s armed and internal security forces, explicitly tied to efforts to disarm Hezbollah and uphold UN Resolution 1701, the framework governing the cessation of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel. This aid was a continuation of long-standing U.S. support to the Lebanese Armed Forces, which has included training, equipment, and weapons for years. By expanding support now, Washington is signaling its intent to strengthen the army as the institution it sees best positioned to manage, or eventually absorb, the security role currently filled by Hezbollah. This significant investment underscores that American aid is not only about preventing state collapse but also about shaping Lebanon’s security order in ways that align with its regional agenda.
 
Strategic Geography

Meanwhile, the expansion of the embassy in Awkar, reveals how deeply embedded American influence has become in Lebanon’s post-war landscape. Described by then Ambassador David Hale as a symbol of an “enduring partnership” between the two countries, the project is one of the largest U.S. embassies in the world, second only to Baghdad. While officially framed as a commitment to a “secure, stable, and sovereign Lebanon”, its size reflects recognition of Lebanon’s strategic location at the intersection of Syria, Israel, and the Eastern Mediterranean. From Awkar, the U.S. can monitor Hezbollah, track Iranian influence, and coordinate military and aid programs that shape Lebanon’s internal balance of power.

Similarly, the revival of the Kleiat (René Mouawad) Airport project in northern Lebanon reflects similar strategic logic. Just seven kilometers from Syria and near Tripoli, the site has long attracted U.S. and regional interest for its potential dual civilian–military use. All these steps signals that U.S. has long-term strategic interests in Lebanon.
 
 
Tom Barrack and the Politics of Containment
 
Of course, U.S. interests and commitments towards Lebanon comes at a certain cost. This intertwining of soft power and hard security reflects how U.S. investment in Lebanon operates on both economic and strategic levels. U.S. envoy Tom Barrack’s repeated visits to Beirut reveal Washington’s broader goal: to manage regional security while maintaining influence within Lebanon’s fragile political system. His statements on  disarmament and state reform show that U.S. aid and diplomacy are not separate from security interests, they are part of a single strategy that blends development with geopolitical control.
 
His active involvement fits into a broader U.S. strategy that became more assertive after the war, aiming to contain Hezbollah, limit Iranian influence, and prepare the ground for eventual security normalization between Beirut and Tel Aviv. By describing disarmament as a “Lebanese-led process”, the U.S. frames its involvement as supportive of national sovereignty while maintaining a guiding role in Lebanon’s path toward stability. This approach shows the U.S. attempting to support Lebanon’s sovereignty while also pursuing its regional security priorities, placing it in an active but measured role within both local and regional developments.
 
Hezbollah, meanwhile, accuses Barrack of attempting to provoke internal conflict by pushing the army toward confrontation, serving Israeli interests at Lebanon’s expense. Barrack, in turn, situates Lebanon’s crisis within a broader regional map involving Israel, Syria, and Iran, warning that Lebanon risks being “swallowed” by its neighbors without action.

In conclusion, the U.S.’s investments in Lebanon, from embassies and education to security support and strategic projects, reflect a deliberate strategy: Lebanon’s location, institutions, and regional significance make it a key partner in promoting stability in the Middle East. Washington continues to “bet” on Lebanon because supporting its political and security landscape helps foster regional stability and cooperation.

Critics see leverage, others see stabilization, yet Lebanon’s challenge remains turning foreign support into real state capacity. The question remains: how much of Lebanon will benefit from the U.S. role and at what cost?

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​About the Author
Natalie Dergham was an intern in IFI's Regional & International Affairs Cluster.