Is it Time for GCC to Diversify its Security Partnerships? Lessons from Qatar

Gulnar Kajan

In early September 2025, Israel attacked Hamas’ negotiation team in a densely populated area of Doha, including civilian and diplomatic infrastructure. Chief negotiator Khalil Al-Hayya’s son was killed alongside his office director, 3 Palestinian bodyguards, and a Qatari security officer.

The negotiations aimed to discuss a plan put forward by the US, using US-sanctioned Qatari mediation. Qatari officials have repeatedly stated that Doha opened Hamas’s political office at Washington’s request, with Sheikh Meshal bin Hamad Al Thani noting that the U.S. sought the office to maintain indirect communication with Hamas. The US informed Qatar of the attack ten minutes after its occurrence. In an interview with CNN, the Qatari prime minister said “we are betrayed”.
 
This attack raises questions about U.S. security partnerships and the mandates of international mediators. This article examines why Doha and the GCC may need to diversify their security relationships and what alternatives they could pursue   
 
Impacts on the Mediation Mandate
                       
The Israeli attack on Doha casts doubts on Qatar’s ability to protect negotiating parties and itself, undermining its longstanding role as an international mediator and international conflict mediation efforts. Particularly, it impacts Qatar’s channels to armed groups, although Qatar’s longstanding relationship with such groups could withstand such a break in trust. Recognising Qatar’s crucial role in conflict mediation, US Secretary of State visited Doha to encourage the continuation of its services. For Qatar, mediation is constitutionally anchored and central to its national interests, helping maintain regional stability between Iran and the Levant. This makes it unlikely to halt its mediation efforts - demonstrated by Doha’s sustained role in Gaza ceasefire talks.
 
International Implications 
The attack prompts other mediators, and Arab mediators in particular, to question their security and role in regional peace efforts. For example, Oman may question its ability to host Yemen’s Ansarullah if U.S. protection does not extend to potential Israeli attacks. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, which have previously engaged in Palestinian negotiations, may also need to reconsider their security arrangements to continue such efforts. Uncertainty about security during negotiation, despite national interests could impede global peace processes.
 
While there is no international agreement protecting states engaging in mediation efforts from attack by negotiating parties, international norms such as Article 2.4 of the UN Charter and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations exist. Formalising the protection of mediators through international agreements might be necessary.
 
Several commentators predict a move away from discreet, independent mediation toward securitisation and alliance-backed forms as states demand stronger defensive or deterrent guarantees before hosting talks - raising the bar for neutral, informal mediation. Doha is also leading the conversation on the development of mediation strategy through initiatives like the Qatar Mediation Forum which this December focused on subjects like the Changing Landscape of Global Conflict and Mediation.[1] 
 
Casting Doubt on US Security Relations
 
It is important to keep in mind that earlier in June, Iran also struck the US Central Command base in Qatar’s Al Udaid, in retaliation for US strikes on nuclear facilities in Iran. Elizabeth Dent, Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said, “although Washington and Doha are still riding the high of President Trump’s May visit to Qatar and the estimated $1.2 trillion in bilateral agreements it yielded, the fact remains that the country has been targeted by two military attacks since then, due largely to U.S. actions”.
 
Doha’s defence partnership with the U.S. is rooted in the 1992 Defence Cooperation Agreement, which granted the U.S. access to Qatari bases, allowed pre-positioning of equipment, and enabled training for Qatar’s forces. Qatar later invested $8 billion in developing Al Udeid Air Base, supported U.S. naval resupply, and contributed to Combined Task Force 152. Its designation as a Major Non-NATO Ally further expanded access to U.S. military technology, joint research, and maintenance contracts. A week after the Doha attack, the U.S. signed a defence pact with Qatar, declaring that any attack on Qatar constitutes a threat to U.S. peace and security, and committing the U.S. to take all lawful measures, including military action if necessary, to restore stability.
 
Initially, the U.S. presence in the GCC protected the Gulf monarchs from Iran and Iraq. However, new threats are arising on the horizon. Oman’s foreign minister noted on November 11th at the IISS Manama Dialogue that Israel, not Iran, is the prime source of insecurity in the region. The Gulf countries are beginning to realise that they cannot put all their security eggs in one American basket. This sentiment was echoed by former Saudi ambassador to the US and UK at the Milken Institute’s Middle East and Africa Summit in early December.[2]  Commenting on this issue, Founder of Reconnaissance Research, Abdulaziz Al-Anjeri, told Bloomberg, “the US security umbrella is no longer full coverage - it leaves out protection from Israel, and that cannot be undone”.
           
Broader GCC security recalibrations

Experts largely agree that Qatar, along with the rest of the GCC, should diversify strategic defence partnerships. In July of 2024 Qatar and Turkiye bolstered their military ties to reinforce their joint force. Saudi Arabia and Turkiye have collaborated in weapons manufacturing with China. Saudi is also trying to work with Japan and the EU to manufacture fighter jets and eight days after the attacks on Doha, Riyadh signed a defence pact with Pakistan, similar to the pact signed by the US and Qatar.
 
The GCC should look inward to strengthen internal military cooperation. The emergency meeting of the Arab League and Organisation for Islamic Cooperation shortly after the Doha attacks is a great step, though largely symbolic. Alongside this meeting, however, the GCC Joint Defence Council met and condemned the attack on Qatar as a violation of all Gulf states’ security and international law, reaffirming that an assault on one member is an assault on all in accordance with the provisions of the Joint Defence Agreement. It announced steps to deepen defence integration, including enhanced intelligence sharing, upgraded joint defence plans, accelerated missile-warning cooperation, and coordinated air-defence exercises. A cohesive Gulf front could be a great attraction for security partnerships with Europe, and Asian countries that recognise Doha’s importance as a hub for conflict mediation and would have a vested interest in keeping Qatar safe. Although, the UAE and Bahrain's signatory to the Abraham Accords would likely cause complications.
 
The attack on Qatar underscored the longstanding security vulnerability in the Gulf: overreliance on a single external security guarantor. While the U.S. remains central to regional defense, the recent attacks on Doha highlighted the gaps in early-warning coordination and defense mechanisms that no single partner can fully remedy alone. Hence, diversifying security relations would allow GCC states to reduce strategic risk by having access to advanced technologies and strengthening political leverage in an increasingly multipolar environment. This does not mean that GCC states will aim to replace the U.S. alliance structure, but complementing it through new security partnerships with European and Asian defense actors, as well as investing in intra-Gulf security cooperation.

About the Author
Gulnar Kajan was an intern in IFI's Regional & International Affairs Cluster.