Not apathy: why Lebanese youth are rationally opting out of politics

Sara Azzi​

Lebanon is one of the most politically saturated countries in the region, where public life is shaped by sectarian arrangements, geopolitical pressures, and the consequences of state collapse. Yet surveys show that a striking majority of young Lebanese have turned away from formal politics. A recent study finds that nearly 70% of Lebanese youth express little to no interest in politics, while 90% report dissatisfaction with Lebanon’s governance system. [1] For a generation that mobilized in the hundreds of thousands during the 2019 Thawra, this detachment demands explanation

The prevailing narrative casts young people as apathetic or distracted, but this interpretation understates the reality. Lebanese youth are not disengaged because of ignorance or indifference. Most are highly aware of political developments and acutely affected by their consequences. What is often described as “apathy” is better understood as a rational response to a system that offers no meaningful pathways for youth inclusion. This distinction matters: youth disengagement is not a behavioral failure but an institutional one. 

From mobilization to withdrawal

The trajectory from 2019 to today illustrates how initial political enthusiasm gradually hardened into disillusionment. The 2019 Thawra represented a historic moment in which young people articulated demands for accountability, social justice, and non-sectarian reform. That mobilization helped usher in limited but symbolically important gains during the 2022 parliamentary elections, when 13 reformist MPs entered parliament, many of which were backed by youth-driven campaigning.

Yet momentum dissipated. The 2025 municipal elections, the first since Lebanon’s systemic collapse, saw little evidence of substantial youth participation, whether in candidacy or turnout. Established parties regained control of most arenas, and no meaningful youth breakthrough occurred. The arc is consistent; we see initial mobilization, modest openings, institutional resistance, and eventual withdrawal. For many young Lebanese, the lesson seems clear: despite their efforts, the political system remains impermeable.

Why youth withdraw

Lebanese youth are disengaged because political participation offers few credible returns. Three structural barriers are particularly significant.

Firstly, young people face restrictive institutional barriers. Lebanon maintains one of the region’s highest voting ages, at 21. Formal politics remains dominated by entrenched sectarian elites, and running for office requires resources, networks, and patronage relationships that most youth do not possess. Party structures are hierarchical and typically gerontocratic, limiting youth influence even within internal decision-making. Symbolic gestures such as placing a young candidate at the bottom of an electoral list rarely translates into real power.

Second, economic precarity significantly shapes youth political behavior. Youth unemployment in Lebanon has remained high for years, and the economic crisis has deepened vulnerabilities. According to a Migration Insights report, more than 1/3 of the population, and a majority of youth, express a desire to emigrate. Another source notes that 58% of Lebanese under 30 are considering leaving the country. Political engagement requires time, resources, and stability; for many young people navigating inflation, intermittent income, war, and daily uncertainty, survival becomes the primary concern.

Third, youth is almost statistically invisible in Lebanon’s political landscape. Unlike Iraq, Tunisia, or Palestine, Lebanon does not publish youth-disaggregated electoral data. NGOs and monitors track gender but not age. Research on youth politics is sparse, and even international organisations operating in Lebanon tend to consult established experts rather than youth themselves. This absence is not merely a data problem, it is a political one. If youth are not measured or consulted, they cannot be meaningfully integrated into policymaking. Scholars such as Mona Harb have written about this fragmentation and the state’s failure to imagine youth as political agents. Earlier studies similarly highlight a persistent disconnect between youth civic activity and formal political structures.

Taken together, these dynamics create a political environment in which disengagement appears logical. When institutions do not open their doors, young people stop knocking.

Regional contrast and Recommendations

While Lebanon struggles to institutionalize youth inclusion, Iraq offers a contrasting approach. In 2025, Iraq launched its first Youth Advisory Council, selecting 13 young leaders to advise on national programs. Parallel initiatives by Iraq’s Supreme Council for Youth have created youth entrepreneurship hubs, alongside youth climate teams operating across several provinces. Though not flawless, these efforts illustrate how institutional design can influence engagement. When states and institutions create visible roles, youth respond.

Lebanon’s youth disengagement carries significant long-term risks. If young people withdraw from formal politics while simultaneously emigrating at high rates, the country may not lose only its talent but also its future political class. The 2026 parliamentary elections may deepen a cycle in which disinterest leads to abstention, which strengthens established elites and consequently deepens political stagnation. Breaking this dynamic requires more than civic awareness campaigns. It demands institutional change.

To rebuild trust and create meaningful political entry points, Lebanon could: introduce youth quotas within municipal councils or parliamentary committees; institutionalize youth advisory bodies attached to ministries and parliament; and ensure policy consultations include young voices. Addressing data gaps, such as publishing youth-specific turnout figures and creating structured shadowing schemes in ministries could further cultivate a future political class.

These steps would not resolve Lebanon’s political crisis, but they would help prevent the loss of an entire political generation. Lebanon has no shortage of politically conscious youth. What lacks are the structures capable of bringing them into public life as partners in shaping the country’s future.


[1] Khayat & Halabi (2025), Youth and their engagement in Lebanon, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.



​About the Author
Sara Azzi was an intern in IFI's Regional & International Affairs Cluster.