Lorenzo Cogliolo After October 8, 2023, amid Hezbollah’s involvement in cross-border fighting with Israel in solidarity with Hamas’ ‘Operation Al-Aqsa Flood’, Tel Aviv escalated the conflict into a full-blown war on September 17, 2024. After more than 4,000 Lebanese killed, 16,500 wounded, 1.6 million people uprooted, a ground invasion, and relentless bombings resulting in what analysts refer to as urbicide, on November 27, 2024, a ceasefire agreement was signed. Accordingly, the Israeli army has 60 days to withdraw from Lebanon. Despite numerous violations of the ceasefire, early reconstruction efforts have already started. Lessons from the rebuilding of Beirut’s city center following the Lebanese civil war and Haret Hreik after the 2006 July War, can shed light on the interplay between post-war urban recovery and social equity and yielding insights into the current reconstruction process. Beirut Central District
The reconstruction of Beirut’s historic commercial and administrative core in the 1990s stands out as a flagship example of how neoliberal urban policies can shape post-conflict recovery. Led by Solidere, a private real estate agency founded by then-Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, the project aimed to “re-instate Lebanon as a regional service and tourist hub by integrating into Gulf circuits of capital.” Solidere consolidated property rights by expropriating up to 150,000 landowners and tenants in exchange for shares, raising USD 1.6 billion - 30% of Lebanon’s GDP - via stock market listings. Promising high returns, Solidere instead suffered plummeting share values, leaving displaced property owners with little compensation. Meanwhile, luxury hotels, upscale residences, and commercial developments catered to Gulf investors and global elites, isolating the “Beirut Central District” (BCD) from its surrounding neighborhoods. Demolishing 80% of the district’s historic fabric, Solidere transformed the BCD into an “urban enclave of wealth,” rendering it inaccessible to most Beirutis. Two decades later, “despite generous public subsidies and facilities, it has failed to recover the city’s heart or generate an urban life or a functional economy to animate it.” Finally, Solidere’s legacy extends beyond its own failures, marking the financialization of Lebanon’s real estate sector and normalizing speculative practices that contributed to the 2019 currency collapse. Post-2006-war reconstruction of Haret Hreik The 2006 post-war reconstruction of Haret Hreik highlights how residents, barred from rebuilding their homes, turned to political patrons to “protect” their housing rights. Haret Hreik, located in Beirut’s southern suburbs and Hebzollah’s principal urban base, was devastated by Isreali bombings during the July War. Hezbollah took charge of the neighborhood rehabilitation through the Waʿd agency. Many destroyed buildings had previously been legalised after the civil war through an amnesty, but their owners could not rebuild without new clearance. Unable to secure permits, residents delegated reconstruction to Hezbollah, which rebuilt without permits and later secured retroactive legalisation when parliament passed an amnesty in 2014. As a result, reconstruction became a political concession rather than a citizen right. Involving engineers and architects affiliated with Hezbollah’s apparatus, Wa’d prioritized rapid rebuilding to restore the pre-war status quo, despite the area’s chaotic urban fabric. Within five years, 4,700 residential and commercial units were successfully rebuilt. While Hezbollah’s reconstruction efforts were praised for being responsive and effective, they excluded public participation and ignored calls for public amenities such as playgrounds, improved sidewalks, and reduced traffic congestion. As such, the urgency of resettlement to maintain its social base overrode all other priorities. Although the reconstruction was a relative success story for restoring people’s access to their homes, it further entrenched communities as protected constituencies of specific political groups, contributing to “the splintering of Beirut and the enclaving of its southern districts.” In sum, both Solidere and Wa’d illustrate how Lebanon’s post-war reconstruction efforts have been dominated by private initiatives, with the state relinquishing decision-making to non-state actors. The planning followed a top-down approach, guided by a centralist logic aimed at accumulating financial capital in the case of Solidere, and political capital in the case of Wa’d. In both instances, stakeholders experienced a reduction in their ability to participate in shaping the spaces within their city. Challenges to recovery With an already shattered economy, the World Bank estimates the country’s damages and losses from the most recent war at USD 8.5 billion, while the Ministry of Economy’s figures range up to USD 20 billion across key sectors. Yet, from the start of the war, the Lebanese government failed to organize damage assessments, planning, or communication with donors to prepare for the reconstruction challenges once the ceasefire took effect, and recent governmental initiatives have been criticized for lacking transparency and environmental concerns. On its side, Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem promised financial compensation to the displaced population, leaving the issue of reconstruction unresolved. With devastation five times greater than in 2006, the killing of many of Hezbollah’s top leaders, the destruction of its headquarters in Beirut, and the sudden regime change in neighboring Syria threatening to sever its supply routes, all these factors combined could hinder the group’s rebuilding efforts. Compounding these challenges, Iran’s budget deficit worsened by sanctions on its oil exports, expected to increase under Trump’s administration, might reduce funding to its Lebanese ally. This could undermine Hezbollah’s ability to look after the social welfare needs of its constituency, particularly over 1 million displaced or affected Shiite Muslims. Gulf states, whose aid was central to building Lebanon’s villages and towns after the July War, and particularly Riyadh’s involvement in rebuilding Beirut’s city center in the 1990s, have long renounced that role. This time, Lebanon is unlikely to receive significant aid due to strained relations between Hezbollah and the Gulf’s attention on Syria’s recovery efforts. While Western donors and international institutions will likely use the need for rebuilding to push for crucial reforms, these have been persistently obstructed by the political class, who view them as a threat to their interests, especially since the collapse of Lebanon’s banking sector in 2019. Additionally, Syria and Gaza’s reconstruction challenges mean Lebanon isn’t the only country seeking Arab and international aid. On the ground, however, the implementation of the ceasefire agreement - amid Israeli violations and concerns over permanent occupation - remains a precondition for the displaced to return home and for effective reconstruction to begin. Rebuilding trust Despite these challenges, the current crisis offers an opportunity for the government to strengthen its legitimacy and promote state-building. While public agencies may not lead reconstruction entirely, they can, especially municipalities, if adequately empowered, play a crucial role in regulating and planning efforts, and encourage neighborhood-level decision-making. At the same time, it is essential to address challenges such as Lebanon’s unregulated housing crisis to mitigate the risks of a profit-oriented reconstruction. A comprehensive national reconstruction and reform program, led by a credible government committed to institutional and financial reforms, is key to achieving post-war recovery. Ensuring state accountability and transparency will not only rebuild trust with donors, but also avoid repeating past mistakes. As scholar and urbanist Mona Fawaz lucidly asks, “Can reconstruction lead to the recovery of a collective identity under a legitimate state, or will it merely perpetuate divisions and further erode public institutions?” Ultimately, the outcome will depend on how Lebanon, and particularly its newly-elected President and government, navigates this pivotal moment in its rebuilding process. About the Author Lorenzo Cogliolo was an intern in IFI's Regional & International Affairs Cluster.
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