 Joseph Bahout Following the US announcement of an Iran-Israel ceasefire on June 24, are we back to the status quo ante June 12? The answer is yes, albeit with some new and important changes. In this sense, the war is far from over; new scars have been opened, while taking different forms, building on some of the consequences and lessons drawn by all actors. What was expected from the Israeli side was to annihilate Iran’s nuclear program (in terms of physical infrastructure and of those with the expertise to run it), erode and deplete its ballistic capability, decimate Iran’s military and security leadership (‘cut the head after having cut the tentacles’), and fragilize the regime to the extent of letting it crumble from within. From the US side, the expectation was to deal a strong blow to Iran, to bring it to its knees to the negotiating table, and force it to accept what it couldn’t be made to accept before the war - the stated “unconditional surrender!”. Regime change was considered, but not fully decided upon as an objective. After the dust settles and all the chest-beating rhetoric is over, Iran, Israel, and the US will get back to their original aims, strategies, and tactics, within the new constraints and environment produced by this very strange “12-day War.” US President Trump will prolong his delusional conviction that he can now extract from Iran what he could not during 60 days and four rounds of negotiations, building on the self-created illusion that he “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear matrix. This would be a fascinating chapter to read in a new edition of his “The Art of the Deal”! Despite his unpredictable character and volatility of positions, Trump remains a firm believer in “peace through strength.” When it comes to the region, he will continue his versatile zig-zagging between a desire to reach the historical deal with Iran his predecessors could not reach, and the temptation to, in what already appeared as a betrayal of his deep electoral base, join the crowd of ultra neo-conservatives in Netanyahu’s design of reshaping the Middle East. Meanwhile, Israel will temporarily swallow Trump’s humiliating end of this last episode, wait for - and possibly create - a new propitious moment to resume hostilities in any way, shape, or form, including lethal covert operations to fulfill the aims it had set for this conflict from the onset. All this, while waiting for the next opening that would allow for a renewed, full-fledged war that avoids (if possible) errors made in this last one. For Netanyahu, not only is the last episode of warfare one ring - maybe the final one - within a chain of battles that started on October 7, it is also a necessity for his political survival, and one where his legacy is also at stake. Iran, now ever more paranoid and wounded but still as alive a beast as ever, will maximize and upscale its means of regime survival - its ultimate endgame. Playing on the (temporary?) US-Israel rift, Iran will please Trump by coming back to any type of talks the US would suggest, but not without its cat-and-mouse negotiation tactics. It may temporarily withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty or some of its provisions. Iran will surely seek to accelerate enrichment and the path toward a complete cycle of military nuclearization (at least until the real threshold); all still within reach, according to most reports following US and Israel’s recent strikes. Iran will seek to consolidate its regional and international alliances and rapprochements, while possibly rebuilding and consolidating its proxies’ networks, significantly altered by the wars and developments of the past two years. In the best of scenarios, all this means that we are in a lull – whether long or short will depend on the diplomatic ballet that will now resume. At the same time, this also means that the region is bound for a new phase of instability and uncertainty, with low-intensity frictions taking again the relay of full-scale spats, whether in Iraq, Yemen, or Lebanon. Finally, on Lebanon, this ending footnote…Israel could very well be tempted to substitute its temporary failure in Iran with a “finish the unfinished job” in Lebanon move. This would entail acting forcefully to destroy Hezbollah’s remaining military capacities, both through heavy and deep airstrikes and/or through a limited ground incursion to create a new political-strategic equation. In such a context, Hezbollah will be much stiffer in its behavior, partly because it will be subject to an enhanced and renewed Iranian investment, and partly because the dialogue about its disarmament would become even more difficult if not impossible. Besides the military character of this stiffness, Hezbollah’s supporters would also be an active asset, further emboldened by the government’s inaction on the front of reconstruction and support following a devastating war. In order to avoid such a foreseeable calamity, time is now extremely pressing for a serious, concrete, and in-depth conversation the Lebanese executive must conclude with Hezbollah, on the roadmap and parameters of their military demobilization and full transition towards legitimate, collective political life. Paradoxically, regional turmoil - and Iran’s new conundrum in particular - could well turn out to offer the favorable conditions and arguments to achieve this. About the Author
Joseph Bahout is Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs and Associate Professor of Practice at the Department of Political Studies at AUB. |