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Yeghia Tashjian  Photo Credits: Valdai Discussion Club On February 13-14, 2024, I received an invitation to attend the 13th Middle East Conference of the Valdai Discussion Club and the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow. The conference, titled “Time for Decisive Action: A Comprehensive Settlement for the Sake of Stability in the Region,” assembled more than 50 participants from 16 countries, mainly from Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Arab countries. Notable figures at the event included Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, who delivered a speech, and Mikhail Bogdanov, the Deputy Foreign Minister and Special Presidential Representative on the Middle East.
The event was important in assessing the post-October 7 developments in the region and analyzing how Russia is positioned in this challenging environment. The conference was divided into six sessions: “Towards a Comprehensive Settlement in the Middle East,” “Heritage of Colonial Policy and Its Echoes in the Middle East,” “Question of Palestine – What Is Next?,” “Diversity of Actors in the Middle East: Is Balance Achievable?,” “Is a Nuclear-free Middle East Possible?,” and finally, “Economic Cooperation in the Region: Opportunities and Challenges.” During the last session, I discussed the economic corridors, interconnectivity, and bilateral ties between Russia and main regional actors. In addition to addressing the escalation in Gaza and the Palestinian Question, the conference explored the dynamics of Russian-Turkish relations, Iran’s motives in the region, and the rise of non-state actors. It was mentioned that positive interaction with Turkey is crucial for Moscow to address its objectives in the region. In this regard, Taha Ozhan, the Research Director of Ankara Institute, and Pavel Shlykov from the Department of History of the Near and Middle East at the Lomonosov Moscow State University reflected on the complex relationship between Turkey and Russia, later published into papers. Ozhan and Shlykov argue that a personal dynamic shapes the relationship between the two countries, citing personal interactions between Presidents Putin and Erdogan. They emphasize that the flexibility and compartmentalization of conflicts are facilitating strong and smooth progress in developing bilateral ties. Ozhan argued that Turkey is finding itself in a geographically challenging region affected by international geopolitical polarization and regional tensions. Consequently, managing security risks is becoming imperative for Turkey and its “exceptional relationship with Russia has allowed it to preserve both its interests and relations with Moscow since the early days of the war.” Shlykov stated that Turkey, a NATO member and once pro-Western country, is now positioning itself as an independent and proactive player in the region, engaging in “strategic hedging.” The Russian expert mentioned that Turkey’s mediation activities, mainly related to Ukraine, have served Russian interests and elevated Turkey’s standing in the region. However, despite all the pragmatism and foresight of Turkey’s diplomatic tactics in the Middle East, there are still some limitations preventing Turkey from determining the regional order. Shlykov concluded that Turkey is becoming another player that amplifies multipolarity in the Middle East. Iran is another important player in the region, collaborating with key partners and non-state actors such as Hezbollah and pro-Iran Iraqi militias. Iran’s objective is to expel US troops from Iraq and Syria. While this would not be an easy task for Iran, the growing pressure on the US and intensified attacks on its military bases in these countries may impact the views and positions of the main US presidential candidates this Autumn. Former President and primary Republican presidential candidate, Donald Trump, hinted at his intention to withdraw US troops from North-Eastern Syria, thus exposing the vulnerability of the Kurds and placing them at the mercy of Ankara, Moscow, Tehran, and Damascus. In his speech, Lavrov also hinted that the “Americans will not stay there forever.” Having control over North-Eastern Syria, Russia would strengthen its position over regional stakeholders active in Syria and gain access to the energy resources located in the region. The escalation in Gaza also raised the importance of regional non-state actors such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis, and others for Russia. These non-state actors are now asserting themselves through either proxy or direct wars, challenging the Western-imposed regional order in the Middle East. It is not surprising that the conference was preceded by a report paper presented by the Valdai Club titled “Gaza. Yemen. Epicenters of Pain. Feelings, Myths and Memory in the Middle East,” which studies the identity-making and mobilization of the above-mentioned non-state actors in the region. The war in Ukraine has pushed Russia to seek new partners in the region and actively engage with them in reshaping regional politics. The war in Gaza is a golden opportunity for Russia to engage with Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan in addressing a comprehensive peace deal to the Palestinian question. Hence, by bringing the policies of these countries closer, Russia aims to consolidate its diplomatic posture in the region and form a united front to pressure the US into addressing the two-state solution. For this purpose, from February 29 to March 2, intra-Palestinian meetings and talks were held in Moscow under the Russian government’s auspices. Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Fateh, and around ten other Palestinian organizations participated in these consolation meetings. According to Bogdanov “Moscow’s goal is to help various Palestinian forces agree to unite their ranks politically.” By hosting these meetings, Russia is promoting itself as a defender of the Palestinian cause, thus sending a strong positive message to the wider Arab and Islamic world. Meanwhile, Moscow continues to positively engage with Hamas, viewing it as a key non-state regional actor that Russia must deal with to assert greater influence in the Middle East. Understanding these developments, Russia’s increasing economic and political interaction and involvement in the Middle East will further enhance cooperation between Moscow, Ankara, Tehran, and the Gulf countries. As each of these actors individually lacks the capability to shape regional security, despite their differences, they can compartmentalize these differences and act together in shaping the multipolar regional system. If according to Russia, the war in Ukraine has enhanced the transition of the global system to a multipolar world order and has given additional space for the “World Majority” (non-Western states), the war in Gaza has tarnished the image of the West in the region and pushed regional actors to deepen their cooperation with other global actors, such as Russia and China, to reshape the new regional security architecture. About the Author Yeghia Tashjian is International Affairs Cluster Coordinator at IFI. Comments are closed.
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