 Photo Credit: https://www.presidency.gov.lb/ Bertille Lietar On October 8, when Hezbollah opened a front in South Lebanon to support Hamas against Israel, it plunged a politically paralyzed country into an unpredictable dynamic, pushing the issue of the presidential vacuum into the background. Left without a President since October 2022 and without a fully-fledged Government, the Lebanese state finds itself limited in controlling the extent of a conflict it is unwilling to entertain. The deadlock around the presidential election crystallized in a disagreement among the diverse Lebanese political parties for a candidate. Having failed to convince its Christian ally, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), to back its candidate Sleiman Frangieh, the Amal-Hezbollah duo did not secure a sufficient majority to guarantee his election in Parliament. Since the end of the term of President Michel Aoun, the two have engaged in defaulting the quorum before the second turn of voting sessions, depriving the Parliament of its ability to elect a President. However, the twelfth and last electoral session, held in June 2023, had allowed for the emergence of an opposition candidate, Jihad Azour, former IMF director for the Middle East and Central Asia, supported by most Christian parties. Since then, efforts to hold discussions and ultimately reach a consensus on a candidate have been unsuccessful. The initiative of Parliament Speaker and head of the Amal Movement Nabih Berri to conduct a dialogue ahead of open electoral sessions had failed to convince the opposition even before being aborted by the eruption of the conflict in Lebanon. The hostilities burdened the electoral process even further, becoming an additional pretext to prolong the political impasse and push the opposition parties to toughen their stance against Hezbollah. In the early stages of the conflict, based on its empowered position as it held control of the security fate of Lebanon, Hezbollah seemed capable of using the presidency as a bargaining chip. The anti-Hezbollah front had expressed concerns regarding a possible trade-off between safeguarding Lebanon from a wider conflict, notably through compliance with the UNSC resolution 1701, and the international endorsement for the candidacy of Sleiman Frangieh.
However, as the conflict has stalled over the last five months, Hezbollah has appeared more vulnerable than foreseen. Despite Israel intensifying its military campaign in Lebanon, exceeding the usual tit-for-tat exchanges with Hezbollah by targeting strongholds of the militia in Baalbek at multiple instances, Hezbollah has continuously refrained from equally replicating or escalating. It has become evident that Hezbollah and its regional ally, Iran, are keen on avoiding an inconveniently-timed war. To Hezbollah in particular, broadening the conflict would affect a Lebanese population that cannot bear its consequences after years of an acute socio-economic crisis, risking deteriorating its prevailing footing in Lebanese politics. Israel also understood this and is willing to use this liability to wring out security guarantees and diminish the power of Hezbollah as much as possible by intensifying its military campaign in Lebanon. Furthermore, Hezbollah might have bet that by conditioning the end of their attacks to a ceasefire in Gaza, it would be able to uphold both the status quo at the border and retain its influential position in the presidential file. However, as talks for a temporary ceasefire in Gaza continuously failed, especially after the awaited deadline of the beginning of Ramadan, the possibility of such a way out for Hezbollah looks unpromising. It has become clear that Israel, and not Hezbollah, is the one looming the threat of a war over Lebanon. This shift in the balance of power has also become evident to the international actors involved in Lebanon. In particular, the countries of the quintet — France, the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar — who have been encouraging discussions to overcome the political standstill since the summer of 2023, are concurrently assuming an increasingly important role in de-escalating the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. However, as U.S. Special Envoy Amos Hochstein shared with the Lebanese authorities in early March, Israel is not willing to revert to the pre-October 7 status quo with Hezbollah and is seeking sustainable security guarantees, either through diplomatic negotiations or military means. Considering that the possibility of an escalation lingers on, international actors are pushing for a viable diplomatic outcome. The United States and France have proposed implementing Resolution 1701, involving the retreat of Hezbollah forces away from the border to create a buffer zone, and a possible ambitious border demarcation that could lead to a settlement on the thirteen contested locations along the Blue Line. Nonetheless, as noted by the Egyptian Ambassador to Lebanon and the French Foreign Minister, if Lebanon intends to participate in upcoming negotiations in a post-October 7 regional order, it needs to fully restore its state institutions, starting with the election of a president. Without a legitimate Lebanese state to engage in negotiations with, Israel could deem more profitable, or even opportune, to continue extending the outreach of its military actions in Lebanon rather than engage in a diplomatic process. Furthermore, while at the moment, the United States is pressuring Israel to prevent a regional escalation, this stance might fade as the country approaches its presidential elections. If a second Trump administration materializes in November, the United States will all the more favor the interests of Israel in the long run. Given that the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel persists, overcoming the Lebanese political deadlock has become more critical than ever to ensure that a diplomatic resolution remains an option. Sternly indifferent to what they considered solely internal disagreements, traditional foreign powers had, for once, kept their distance from the Lebanese presidential elections. Yet, the search for a de-escalation in the south of Lebanon has reopened the door to heightened interference through the quintet. In parallel, talks on the presidential file are picking up at the Lebanese political level. In late February, the National Moderation bloc, a group of Sunni MPs formerly close to Saad Hariri, relaunched prospects for a dialogue on the presidential deadlock. If the Christian opposition, notably the FPM and the Lebanese Forces, and Hezbollah’s partner Nabih Berri have favorably welcomed the initiative, although they do not fully agree on its terms, Hezbollah has yet to comment on it. Holding on to Sleiman Frangieh now appears to be a risky gamble to insist upon in the face of an ever-increasing threat of escalation with Israel. The question remains whether Hezbollah will be willing to cast aside its candidate and make a step toward the opposition, notably its forsaken FPM ally, by allowing the emergence of a consensus candidate. About the Author Bertille Lietar Tell was International Affairs Cluster intern at IFI. Comments are closed.
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