 Yeghia Tashjian In his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, one of the world’s leading realist scholars John J. Mearsheimer argues that in an unbalanced multipolarity, the balance of power is so asymmetrically distributed in favor of one side, that other great powers have no choice but to come together in order to balance the hegemonic power. This is the only rational choice among other great powers. As such, this kind of international order is fragile and always prone to wars. Within this logic, many would assume that Eurasian powers such as Russia and China should have fully backed Iran or its non-state allies in the Middle East to defeat Israel, or at least contain US interests in the region. Interestingly, this is not the case. Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi (another rising Eurasian power) are engaging in strategic balance and realpolitik to assess the situation, waiting for the outcome of the US presidential elections, and aiming to contain any spillover effect to their zone of influence. Can Russia be Part of a Future Ceasefire Deal?
Russia views Lebanon as an extension of its Syrian policy. This has remained relatively unchanged over the past few years. It aims to increase its soft power and diplomatically engage with different Lebanese political and communal actors. Moreover, Russia is aware of its limitations in Lebanon compared to other actors such as the US and Iran. As one Russian scholar once told me at a conference at Pyatigorsk “Look Yeghia, Lebanon is too small, but too complicated for Russia.” As such, Moscow does not aim nor has the political resources to dive into Lebanon’s internal political mess. When it comes to the ongoing war between Hezbollah and Israel, and the regional tensions between Israel and Iran, Russia aims to cautiously navigate along the mines aiming to secure its regional geopolitical and geo-economic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, mainly Syria. With the global order shifting, Russia and the US are aiming to contain each other in different regions and redraw the post-Cold War era map of spheres of influence. Within this context, Tehran and Hezbollah’s military role in Syria in defeating the US-backed rebels was crucial in securing Moscow’s gains in the Levant. The defeat of Hezbollah or a regime change in Iran wouldn’t be in Moscow’s strategic interest as it would ultimately increase US influence, and a new power vacuum may give rise to religious radicalism. Hence, it is not surprising that Moscow advised Damascus to take a passive stance in this war. While Syria has been a transit for arms transfer from Iran to Lebanon, President Bashar Assad’s government under Russian instruction has been cautious not to be involved in this war and keep a ‘close eye’ on Israel’s airstrikes against Iranian assets in the country. This flexibility in the long run – if the war continues ‘managed’ – may serve Moscow and would further facilitate Syria’s opening to the Gulf states and to attract investments towards the country’s reconstruction. Some also may argue that there seems to be an agreement between Tel Aviv and Moscow, that the former would not sell weapons to Kyiv and in return, Russia would deliberately ignore Israel's airstrikes on Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria. There are also rumors that Israel may need Russia to deploy a monitoring force near the Syrian-Lebanese border to prevent Hezbollah from arming in the future, thus making Russia part of a future ceasefire deal and increase Russia’s leverage on Beirut and Damascus. Iran’s importance for Russia increasingly grew with the war in Ukraine. Iran plays an important transit role for Russia within the context of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). To avoid a large-scale regional confrontation, Moscow has made great “secret efforts” to limit the impact of the Israeli strike on Iran. This has shown that Russia still has certain leverage to contain the situation. Moreover, Russia is in no position to take a side in this war in favor of Iran and antagonize Israel, as Moscow aims to secure its geo-economic interests in the East Mediterranean when it comes to energy security. Coming to an understanding with Israel over the gas file related to the EastMed project is important, so that Russia does not get excluded from the region as Europe seeks to decrease its dependence on Russian gas.[1] China’s Balancing Act China is also engaged in strategic balancing. As the main guarantor of the reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, China is concerned about a larger regional escalation that would threaten its energy security and economic interests in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. After October 7, Beijing tried to maintain a balanced foreign policy, which aimed to preserve its economic ties with Israel and advocate for a two-state solution and establishment of a Palestinian state. The Chinese government presented a five-point proposal to the UNSC to end the conflict, which included: reaching a comprehensive ceasefire; ending the fighting; protecting civilians; providing humanitarian aid; and enhancing diplomatic mediation to secure a political solution for the conflict. However, its diplomatic efforts failed given the lack of US support. Amid China’s inability to use its leverage, Beijing may face certain economic restrictions in the region, as Chinese investors would refuse to engage in economic risks and invest in key infrastructural projects in Iran or Israel, thus limiting China’s leverage on both actors. India: Navigating Between Israeli and Iranian Mines India also engages in strategic balancing, although it isn’t as involved in the region as much as Russia and China. India’s interests are mainly limited to trade and investments. As such, India has two major projects in the region at stake: the INSTC and the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC). Through INSTC, India aims to invest in the Iranian Chabahar port and trade with Russia and Central Asia. The positioning of the INSTC as an alternative and shorter route compared to the Suez Canal route is a major advantage, which aims to contain China’s Belt and Road Initiative-related projects in Central Asia. A memorandum of understanding supported by the United States was signed and designed to enhance an initiative that would strengthen regional communication and transportation systems, connecting the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf, Israeli ports, and Europe. Israel was a key transit country connecting the Middle East to Europe. IMEC's importance also stems from its competition with the existing Suez Canal trade route, avoiding Yemeni Houthi militia attacks on ships in the Red Sea, and bypassing the coasts of Yemen. The US supported this project to counter growing Chinese influence in the region and facilitate reconciliation between Israel and Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia. During the 79th session of the UN General Assembly, Israel’s PM Benyamin Netanyahu called this corridor a “blessing” for the region and referred to Iran and its allies as a “curse.” He also mentioned that this project would open the path to creating a “New Middle East” that would bring peace and stability. However, this project has been delayed due to the ongoing war between Israel, Hamas, and Hezbollah. As such, both the INSTC and IMEC hold geo-economic and geopolitical significance for India. Destabilizing Iran and Israel, and with it the entire Middle East, is not in India’s interest. A Realpolitik Perspective Russia, China, and India have strategic assets in Israel and Iran, and they all aim to maintain regional stability for this purpose. Their behavior in international politics hints that the global order is still in a transitional phase and yet to be shaped. Within this process, and as the system becomes fragile, we will witness more conflicts and wars, as no single power will emerge as hegemonic enough to dictate its terms on others. At the same time, Eurasian powers are not in a position to form a unilateral alliance or bloc to contain the US just yet. Therefore, Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi will continue engaging in a strategic balancing between Iran and Israel to secure their geopolitical and geo-economic interests. Their behavior is also dependent on the outcome of the US presidential elections, which will shape the future of US foreign policy towards the Middle East and whether the US will be successful in brokering a ceasefire in the region. As such, the behavior and actions of these actors can be understood from a purely realpolitik angle, practical and interest-oriented, with little ideological or moral considerations. [1] The Eastern Mediterranean pipeline or EastMed is a planned offshore/onshore natural gas pipeline, directly connecting East Mediterranean energy resources, mainly Israel, to mainland Greece via Cyprus and Crete and then Europe. About the Author Yeghia Tashjian is the Regional and International Affairs Cluster Coordinator at IFI. Comments are closed.
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