 Alexander Haddad and Yeghia Tashjian On January 7, 2026, the White House announced the US withdrawal from 66 international organizations, conventions, and treaties. This comes after the already announced withdrawal in 2025 from UNESCO, the Paris Climate agreement (both anew after first withdrawals in 2017 and in 2019 respectively, then reversed by President Biden) and the World Health Organization (WHO). Given the plethora of existing organizations, conventions and mechanisms, the number is not necessarily surprising or definitive, though the implications and rationale are sometimes more difficult to grasp. Are these institutions effectively acting contrary to the ‘interests’ of the United States?[MC1] What role do they play globally? How will this impact the global order? Beyond the immediate political signal, these withdrawals raise deeper questions about the future of global governance, scientific cooperation, and geopolitical leadership.
Overall, as the biggest and richest economy in the world, the US was generally the largest single financial contributor to most of these institutions. They covered typically a fifth to a third of their budget. Moreover, unlike in the IMF and World Bank, where US voting power reflects capital subscriptions, decision making in these international agencies operate largely on the principle of sovereign equality, irrespective of financial contribution. This limits the formal voting rights to one vote, relying instead on diplomatic and political lobbying. In effect, the decision to withdraw from some of the conventions may take one to two years to become effective. As the membership to them is constitutionally dependent on a vote by the US Congress, there is additional uncertainty about the President’s legal authority to withdraw unilaterally. Scientific cooperation under strain The effects on the global order and on other nations are difficult to foresee, especially on scientific cooperation. According to a conservative classification based on primary mandates, five institutions listed in the White House’s decision are linked to climate change, nine to the environment, and four to six to renewable energies. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) act as important scientific bodies, coordinating the work of researchers and scientists in their respective fields across the world. Many American researchers who were involved will probably stay, as they were nominated by their universities or through scientific credentials rather than government designation.[1] Overall activity would nevertheless be significantly affected were budgets to fall by 20 to 35%. The IUCN’s national committee in the US is the largest of the organization, and its disappearance would certainly affect global conservation actions of threatened natural species, including within the US. The future of international negotiations: continuing on a rocky path or unleashing the robbers The road ahead for future international negotiations is more unclear than ever. The US played various roles in international negotiations, most prominently of which are of course the climate change and the biodiversity Conferences of Parties (COPs). They often slowed down decisions on new progressive tools, along with fossil fuel producing countries and had often a dealmaking role. It is unclear, therefore, how future negotiations will unfold in the absence of American negotiators, towards more progressive instruments or towards a lack of leadership and a slow sidelining of these institutions. Most of the other G20 nations claimed they will continue to cooperate within these institutions and continue their integration. For instance, on January 9, the EU formally approved the free trade agreement negotiated for 25 years with the Mercosur bloc (which includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay). However, in parallel, European countries and China announced in recent months that they will not be able to fill the financial void left by the US, nor compensate for missing contributions, at a time when European state budgets are increasingly constrained by growing defense expenses and rising public debts. Within this context, German President Walter Steinmeier warned “today, it is about preventing the world from turning into a den of robbers, where the most unscrupulous take whatever they want.” The remaining G20 nations have the moral duty to work to avoid such a fate and preserve what is left of the rule-based international law. The role that China will play is critical, as they presented themselves as the new prime supporter of globalization and of renewables in recent years. Who will fill the US vacuum? As the US is showing signs of strategic retrenchment and selective disengagement from multilateral leadership, Europe and China are emerging as the most capable, responsible, and financial capable actors to fill this vacuum. However, their approaches reflect contrasting visions of the global order. Europe seeks to preserve the US-founded liberal global order, while China aims to reshape it and shift towards a more multipolar order. This divergence of visions will likely lead to a fragmented and competitive reshaping of global institutions rather than a single replacement hegemon. Europe’s influence will come primarily through value-based institutional continuity. The European Union is well positioned to reinforce and reform multilateral institutions. However, its ability to replace the US is constrained by internal fragmentation, security dependence, and economic overextension. What about China? Over the previous decade, commentators observed a rising presence of Chinese nationals at ever higher executive positions in international organizations and in many UN bodies in particular. Some commentators warned of a “Chinese offensive” at the UN. It must be acknowledged that if China effectively has increased its presence in other senior positions, it is widely doing so in parallel to its increased financial and political weight. At the same time, China is reshaping global governance through institutional diversification (actively engaging or leading the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, etc.) rather than reform US-established institutions from within. Therefore, despite attempting to fill the US vacuum and establish alternative institutions, China is not ready to take the lead in global governance just yet. Reflection Instead of collectively addressing the US vacuum, Europe and China are expected to influence a complex global order – marked by intersecting institutions, conflicting values, and strategic alignments. Europe will uphold rule-based multilateralism, while China will increase its influence via its alternative initiatives and filling key posts in international agencies. For middle and small states, this phenomenon presents both chances for diversification but also dangers of institutional disintegration. The outcome does not necessarily signify the demise of global governance, but rather a transformation into a more diverse regionalized framework of a global order already shaping. [1] Many international organizations function though on a membership basis: only nationals of countries member to the organization can be recruited. About the Authors Alexander Haddad is the Sustainability and Inclusive Development Cluster Coordinator at IFI. Yeghia Tashjian is the Regional and International Affairs Cluster Coordinator at IFI. Comments are closed.
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